4 ms·

All tarbals are signed via linux kernel archives gpg key, which according to the kernel.org security breach announcement was not compromised. So I don't see a p

by marbu 15y ago

All tarbals are signed via linux kernel archives gpg key, which according to the kernel.org security breach announcement was not compromised. So I don't see a problem here.

recoiledsnake 15y ago
Don't you see the problem with the server hosting both the tar balls and the signature being compromised?
- bonzoesc 15y ago
  The signature can be validated with a public key not available on the server.
  - recoiledsnake 15y ago
    "can be' is different from 'is'. Since the attackers had root, what if they served up rootkitted kernels 1% of the time someone downloaded a tar ball?
    - bonzoesc 15y ago
      The downloaders will have to be aware of the "no warranty" clause of the license Linux uses, and take responsibility for the software they bring into their environment. The kernel developers provide instructions[1] on how to cryptographically verify the authenticity of a downloaded kernel, including building a PGP "trust path" to their key. 1: http://kernel.org/signature.html http://kernel.org/signature.html
      - recoiledsnake 15y ago
        The signatures themselves are hosted on kernel.org...
        bonzoesc 15y ago
        So? An attacker's not going to have the private key they were created with, and probably won't have a private key that you have an existing trust relationship to.
- marbu 15y ago
  The linux kernel archive public key (which is needed to verify the signature) is well known and many people have it's own copy for several years. But if the atacker gained access to the private key, he would be able to sign trojanized tarballs without anybody noticing. On the one hand kernel.org page doesn't mention this kind of breach and the key is still used, on the other hand there are rumors (https://lwn.net/Articles/457142/ https://lwn.net/Articles/457142/) that the private key was available on the compromised server so that the atacker could produce trojanized tarballs with proper signature - but I find it unlikely because the kernel.org admins doesn't warn users about it and haven't changed the key.

by marbu 15y ago

All tarbals are signed via linux kernel archives gpg key, which according to the kernel.org security breach announcement was not compromised. So I don't see a problem here.

recoiledsnake 15y ago

Don't you see the problem with the server hosting both the tar balls and the signature being compromised?

bonzoesc 15y ago
The signature can be validated with a public key not available on the server.
- recoiledsnake 15y ago
  "can be' is different from 'is'. Since the attackers had root, what if they served up rootkitted kernels 1% of the time someone downloaded a tar ball?
  - bonzoesc 15y ago
    The downloaders will have to be aware of the "no warranty" clause of the license Linux uses, and take responsibility for the software they bring into their environment. The kernel developers provide instructions[1] on how to cryptographically verify the authenticity of a downloaded kernel, including building a PGP "trust path" to their key. 1: http://kernel.org/signature.html http://kernel.org/signature.html
    - recoiledsnake 15y ago
      The signatures themselves are hosted on kernel.org...
      - bonzoesc 15y ago
        So? An attacker's not going to have the private key they were created with, and probably won't have a private key that you have an existing trust relationship to.
marbu 15y ago
The linux kernel archive public key (which is needed to verify the signature) is well known and many people have it's own copy for several years. But if the atacker gained access to the private key, he would be able to sign trojanized tarballs without anybody noticing. On the one hand kernel.org page doesn't mention this kind of breach and the key is still used, on the other hand there are rumors (https://lwn.net/Articles/457142/ https://lwn.net/Articles/457142/) that the private key was available on the compromised server so that the atacker could produce trojanized tarballs with proper signature - but I find it unlikely because the kernel.org admins doesn't warn users about it and haven't changed the key.