6 ms·

I read the book in question. A password to an encrypted file is given at some point, but it is presented as a one-time thing to transfer a specific private file

by a3_nm 15y ago

I read the book in question. A password to an encrypted file is given at some point, but it is presented as a one-time thing to transfer a specific private file. If Wikileaks reused this password for something else, then it's pretty stupid of them.

RuadhanMc 15y ago
Someone, somewhere, screwed up. It's quite odd. Certainly Assange is quite technically savvy -- he's a reformed (genuine) hacker -- after all. So I just can't imagine him re-using passwords. Similarly, I would have thought that he'd be enough of a control freak to, you know, check this stuff out himself.
- jarin 15y ago
  To be fair, he may not be sitting around running port scanners and wardialers anymore, but I'd hardly call him reformed.
  - xtracto 15y ago
    What does it mean to be a "reformed hacker" anyway? Does it mean that he does not black-hat hack anymore? Or that he does not "hack"? How do we know he does not "hack"? maybe he doesn't do it publicly but he still "hacks" to his OSX/Linux box.
    - RuadhanMc 15y ago
      Well in the 80's and 90's when Assange did the illegal hacking, that we're aware of, hackers weren't what we call hackers today. So a reformed hacker in my books is someone who no longer illegally hacks into property that is not theirs. In "Hacker News" existed a decade+ ago then it would have been filled with black-hats.
      - indrax 15y ago
        Hack is orthogonal to legal. Hack is orthogonal to personal gain.
- cookiecaper 15y ago
  I agree that this is a weird thing. From my reading it appears that the encrypted archive sent to the Guardian got out somehow and that combined with the password (recklessly) published in the book, the data can be decrypted to reveal the full unredacted archive. There are some interesting considerations involved in what this means for distributing highly sensitive data to non-technical people. They apparently have no comprehension that a PGP-encrypted file is not like a web service where you can just go in and change the password in a jiffy -- as long as that file exists, the same password will work on it, forever. The rebuttal quoted indicates that WL said it was a "temporary" password, so it seems that via a misinterpretation at the Guardian, its editors expected the password to stop working on that file in a matter of hours. It would be really interesting to see PGP files that were time-sensitive, and used passwords that only worked within X time. Does anyone know if something like that has been done? What would have been a more secure way to distribute the archive? Only bundle 1000 cables at a time, each file with a unique password? Require journalists to view the files on premises at WL so that there was no loss of control on the data? Bundle everything up in a black-box .exe that self-destructed in x time (though, unless implemented carefully, this would still reveal private data once a competent person got a hold of it)? Why weren't these files asymmetrically encrypted anyway? Surely it is not very likely that the private key of a user would be published in a book or that a user would upload his private key to bittorrent. Lots of interesting possibilities here...
  - nitrogen 15y ago
    It would be really interesting to see PGP files that were time-sensitive, and used passwords that only worked within X time. Does anyone know if something like that has been done? I'm not a cryptographer, but it seems to me like something of this nature is impossible without maintaining control of the decryption process. You could add a timestamp to the file, but the workaround would be to change your computer's clock or rewrite the decryption software. You would have to include a cryptographically-signed timestamp from a trusted time server in the en/decryption process. Once that signed timestamp is obtained, though, it could be distributed along with the password and a modified application that uses the stored timestamp instead of a live one from the server. My knowledge comes from reading about failed DRM schemes and the comments of tptacek and cpercival, so I can only point out things that wouldn't work, not what will.

by a3_nm 15y ago

RuadhanMc 15y ago

Someone, somewhere, screwed up. It's quite odd. Certainly Assange is quite technically savvy -- he's a reformed (genuine) hacker -- after all. So I just can't imagine him re-using passwords. Similarly, I would have thought that he'd be enough of a control freak to, you know, check this stuff out himself.

jarin 15y ago
To be fair, he may not be sitting around running port scanners and wardialers anymore, but I'd hardly call him reformed.
- xtracto 15y ago
  What does it mean to be a "reformed hacker" anyway? Does it mean that he does not black-hat hack anymore? Or that he does not "hack"? How do we know he does not "hack"? maybe he doesn't do it publicly but he still "hacks" to his OSX/Linux box.
  - RuadhanMc 15y ago
    Well in the 80's and 90's when Assange did the illegal hacking, that we're aware of, hackers weren't what we call hackers today. So a reformed hacker in my books is someone who no longer illegally hacks into property that is not theirs. In "Hacker News" existed a decade+ ago then it would have been filled with black-hats.
    - indrax 15y ago
      Hack is orthogonal to legal. Hack is orthogonal to personal gain.
cookiecaper 15y ago
I agree that this is a weird thing. From my reading it appears that the encrypted archive sent to the Guardian got out somehow and that combined with the password (recklessly) published in the book, the data can be decrypted to reveal the full unredacted archive. There are some interesting considerations involved in what this means for distributing highly sensitive data to non-technical people. They apparently have no comprehension that a PGP-encrypted file is not like a web service where you can just go in and change the password in a jiffy -- as long as that file exists, the same password will work on it, forever. The rebuttal quoted indicates that WL said it was a "temporary" password, so it seems that via a misinterpretation at the Guardian, its editors expected the password to stop working on that file in a matter of hours. It would be really interesting to see PGP files that were time-sensitive, and used passwords that only worked within X time. Does anyone know if something like that has been done? What would have been a more secure way to distribute the archive? Only bundle 1000 cables at a time, each file with a unique password? Require journalists to view the files on premises at WL so that there was no loss of control on the data? Bundle everything up in a black-box .exe that self-destructed in x time (though, unless implemented carefully, this would still reveal private data once a competent person got a hold of it)? Why weren't these files asymmetrically encrypted anyway? Surely it is not very likely that the private key of a user would be published in a book or that a user would upload his private key to bittorrent. Lots of interesting possibilities here...
- nitrogen 15y ago
  It would be really interesting to see PGP files that were time-sensitive, and used passwords that only worked within X time. Does anyone know if something like that has been done? I'm not a cryptographer, but it seems to me like something of this nature is impossible without maintaining control of the decryption process. You could add a timestamp to the file, but the workaround would be to change your computer's clock or rewrite the decryption software. You would have to include a cryptographically-signed timestamp from a trusted time server in the en/decryption process. Once that signed timestamp is obtained, though, it could be distributed along with the password and a modified application that uses the stored timestamp instead of a live one from the server. My knowledge comes from reading about failed DRM schemes and the comments of tptacek and cpercival, so I can only point out things that wouldn't work, not what will.