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The idea is that all CA's are effectively fully trustworthy. The public keys for the CA's certs are loaded into browsers. When a specific SSL cert is created th
by InclinedPlane 15y ago
The idea is that all CA's are effectively fully trustworthy. The public keys for the CA's certs are loaded into browsers. When a specific SSL cert is created the private key is generated by the buyer (and never revealed) then the public key for that is sent to the CA and signed. In this way a link of trust is created between the CA and whoever bought the SSL cert.
Now, when a browser is used to go to a website using SSL it will ask that site for its cert, which contains the public key and the digital signature from the CA. If the cert is signed by a CA that the browser trusts then the browser in turn trusts that specific cert. The browser then uses the public key to encrypt a message to the site containing information for encrypting return transmissions to the browser.
The point being, all CA's are on an equal playing field, and fully trusted. The moment any one CA is no longer fully trustworthy or the moment its private key is no longer secure the whole system fails.
- deleted 15y ago[deleted]
- tonfa 15y agoThe said chrome will only accept one particular CA when verifying the signature for google.com (which is one of the reason the fraudulent cert was detected).