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Fine, so it's a (n/p) times 1% tax, where p is the average chance of victory and n is the average number of years in court for each suit. This doesn't seem to
by jessriedel 15y ago
Fine, so it's a (n/p) times 1% tax, where p is the average chance of victory and n is the average number of years in court for each suit. This doesn't seem to change the structure of the incentives at all; it's just a tax on patent infringement damages.
I find the non-retroactive possibility much more interesting.
- beagle3 15y agoI don't disagree a non-retroactive possibility might be better; I just haven't been able to reach a conclusion about it. And, it is more than just a tax on patent infringement damages - because you have to pay the tax upfront, which makes a big difference in cashflow. eolas's $600M verdict against Microsoft, and i4i's $400M verdict would both require posting $6M / $4M per year respectively in never-to-be-recouped taxes, which is a huge sum for the companies in question, and would probably have made them not sue. Furthermore, it involves the IRS in valuations, which is a good thing (because it is much harder to mess with the IRS) - manipulation of the value of a patent would have to be explained, and not arbitrary to avoid taxes. Anyway, we could all dream - it is the lobbyists that write the laws, and the patent holders have thousands of them in DC.