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The argument breaks down for me here: > because the experience of wet is wholly subjective. I can't distinguish this from "wetness is a quale." In which case

The argument breaks down for me here: > because the experience of wet is wholly subjective. I can't distinguish this from "wetness is a quale." In which case the analogy water : wetness :: brain : qualia reduces to water : qualia :: brain : qualia. Also: > the experience of having experiences The fact that we sometimes slip up and use recursive language like this is a suggestive sign to me. We intuit that experience is somehow "already present," or fundamental, as idealism claims. If idealism is true, then you _are_ consciousness, and already know it at some level.

PaulDavisThe1st 5y ago
> the experience of having experiences this is not recursive, really. It is not written to imply that experience is universal, in fact quite the opposite. Most of us generally posit that rocks do not have experiences. Most of us posit that humans do, and likewise (famously) so do bats. But what the experiences that a bat has? It's not unreasonable to assume that they are quite different from the ones a human has. Ergo, we cannot really compare the experiences of a bat with those of a human. But we can note that they both have experiences, and that is the magical part. I was just being flowery by using "experience" twice in a row, but in another sense I was trying to differentiate between the questions of "why are our experiences as they are?" and "why do we have any experience at all?" This is something that I think Dennett in particular fails spectacularly at (and he agreed with me, once :) As for the "wetness is a qualia" point, yes, that is good summary of my point, but I am sorry, I do not understand the notation you are using after that.
- monktastic1 5y ago
  Sorry, didn't realize it's not standard notation. In English: "Water is to wetness as brains are to qualia" reduces to "water is to qualia as brains are to qualia."
- throwaway34241 5y ago
  I agree that people have experiences, but I don't understand why they must be magical or non-existent in the physical world. Why can't the word "experience" simply be referring to the physical processes that happen when our mind/body is in some particular environment? Certainly physically ingesting a small amount of certain psychedelic chemicals can have profound effects on subjective experience, so it can't be too disconnected from physical processes. The whole issue of qualia / experiences seems like it is an extension of the dualist/materialist perspectives rather than something that sheds light on it one way or another - dualists will view qualia as something non-material and so something that materialism can't explain, and materialists will view qualia as something material along with consciousness itself.

PaulDavisThe1st 5y ago

> the experience of having experiences this is not recursive, really. It is not written to imply that experience is universal, in fact quite the opposite. Most of us generally posit that rocks do not have experiences. Most of us posit that humans do, and likewise (famously) so do bats. But what the experiences that a bat has? It's not unreasonable to assume that they are quite different from the ones a human has. Ergo, we cannot really compare the experiences of a bat with those of a human. But we can note that they both have experiences, and that is the magical part. I was just being flowery by using "experience" twice in a row, but in another sense I was trying to differentiate between the questions of "why are our experiences as they are?" and "why do we have any experience at all?" This is something that I think Dennett in particular fails spectacularly at (and he agreed with me, once :) As for the "wetness is a qualia" point, yes, that is good summary of my point, but I am sorry, I do not understand the notation you are using after that.

monktastic1 5y ago
Sorry, didn't realize it's not standard notation. In English: "Water is to wetness as brains are to qualia" reduces to "water is to qualia as brains are to qualia."
throwaway34241 5y ago
I agree that people have experiences, but I don't understand why they must be magical or non-existent in the physical world. Why can't the word "experience" simply be referring to the physical processes that happen when our mind/body is in some particular environment? Certainly physically ingesting a small amount of certain psychedelic chemicals can have profound effects on subjective experience, so it can't be too disconnected from physical processes. The whole issue of qualia / experiences seems like it is an extension of the dualist/materialist perspectives rather than something that sheds light on it one way or another - dualists will view qualia as something non-material and so something that materialism can't explain, and materialists will view qualia as something material along with consciousness itself.