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In 1979 I got a small VIP tour of Pearl Harbor from the Navy. They made sure we understood that the Japanese attack was effective, but far from perfect. I rem

by tacon 5y ago

In 1979 I got a small VIP tour of Pearl Harbor from the Navy. They made sure we understood that the Japanese attack was effective, but far from perfect. I remember they mentioned three strategic mistakes by the Japanese: 1. They did not hit any submarine facilities, so the US submarines continued to operate normally. 2. They did not hit any of the dry dock facilities, so almost all the damaged ships were repaired in place without having to be towed back to the west coast. 3. They did not hit the fuel depots, so the remaining fleet had plenty of fuel ready to go. And, of course, the carriers were out on operations, which was a critical miss, as it turned out.

Arrath 5y ago
> 1. They did not hit any submarine facilities, so the US submarines continued to operate normally. Japanese submarine doctrine (attached to fleet elements in support of seeking battle/harassing the enemy fleet) may have influenced their target selection in going after larger surface combatants in preference to submarines. And yes, that was a huge strategic mistake. U.S. submarines inflicted grievous damage to Japanese merchant shipping throughout the war.
- jcranmer 5y ago
  US submarine effectiveness in the early part of the war was largely nil because the US torpedoes failed to work properly. This wasn't fixed until 1943, so there's a decent chance that even if the submarine facilities had been damaged, they would have been repaired before the US submarines got effective torpedoes anyways.
  - Arrath 5y ago
    This is a good point. Some of the stories around the early war torpedos almost belie belief. "On 24 December 1941, during a war patrol, Commander Tyrell D. Jacobs in Sargo fired eight torpedoes at two different ships with no results. When two additional merchantmen came in view, Jacobs took extra care to set up his torpedo shots. He pursued the targets for fifty-seven minutes and made certain the TDC bearings matched perfectly before firing two torpedoes at each ship from an average range of 1,000 yd (910 m). The shots should have hit, but all failed to explode. A few days after he discovered the torpedoes were running too deep, and corrected the problem, Jacobs detected a big, slow tanker. Again, his approach was meticulous, firing one torpedo at a close range of 1,200 yd (1,100 m). It missed. Exasperated, Jacobs broke radio silence to question the Mark 14's reliability." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Problems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Problems

by tacon 5y ago

Arrath 5y ago

> 1. They did not hit any submarine facilities, so the US submarines continued to operate normally. Japanese submarine doctrine (attached to fleet elements in support of seeking battle/harassing the enemy fleet) may have influenced their target selection in going after larger surface combatants in preference to submarines. And yes, that was a huge strategic mistake. U.S. submarines inflicted grievous damage to Japanese merchant shipping throughout the war.

jcranmer 5y ago
US submarine effectiveness in the early part of the war was largely nil because the US torpedoes failed to work properly. This wasn't fixed until 1943, so there's a decent chance that even if the submarine facilities had been damaged, they would have been repaired before the US submarines got effective torpedoes anyways.
- Arrath 5y ago
  This is a good point. Some of the stories around the early war torpedos almost belie belief. "On 24 December 1941, during a war patrol, Commander Tyrell D. Jacobs in Sargo fired eight torpedoes at two different ships with no results. When two additional merchantmen came in view, Jacobs took extra care to set up his torpedo shots. He pursued the targets for fifty-seven minutes and made certain the TDC bearings matched perfectly before firing two torpedoes at each ship from an average range of 1,000 yd (910 m). The shots should have hit, but all failed to explode. A few days after he discovered the torpedoes were running too deep, and corrected the problem, Jacobs detected a big, slow tanker. Again, his approach was meticulous, firing one torpedo at a close range of 1,200 yd (1,100 m). It missed. Exasperated, Jacobs broke radio silence to question the Mark 14's reliability." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Problems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#Problems