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I don't get it then. If my company holds a huge portfolio of patents, and we sue for $X damages on some subset of them in a given year, we will simply value th
by jessriedel 15y ago
I don't get it then. If my company holds a huge portfolio of patents, and we sue for $X damages on some subset of them in a given year, we will simply value those patents at $X and the rest at zero. Then we recover $X in damages, and pay 1% of X in taxes.
In other words, doesn't this just reduce to a 1% tax on patent damages?
(Even if we think we'll only recover on average p% of our claims, we still only pay 1% of X in taxes to get p% of X in damages. Assuming p% is closer to 50% than 1%, not much changes.)
- beagle3 15y agoNo, it does not reduce to 1%. At worst, it will reduce to (1/p)% (with p<1, you assume p=~0.5), but probably much, much more: All of these processes realistically take months to years (have you noticed how long SCO vs. Novell was going on?) - if you "deactivate" a subset while you're still suing, that reduces your damages. So, you'll have to keep it active, say three years - which with p=0.5 makes it a 6% tax on damages. However, it does chill the chilling effect - right now, e.g. Microsoft has ~20,000 patents, and they can sue anyone for anything. This way, they will actively have to choose strategically what they want to enforce. Finally, and I think I haven't made this clear enough, I don't think my proposal is a GOOD patent system in any way. It is bad. But it is not as bad as the existing system, and (I suspect) it has a much better chance of passing than a complete reform. Furthermore, it stops some of the (currently legal) tax loops that involve passing patents among shell corporations. The basic idea is to align value with cost. Any system in which the value of the patent is potentially infinite (as in the current system) is materially broken, and it is just a matter of time until someone finds a way to game it (non practicing patent trolls). Any sane system must have cost (of patent, property, copyright, etc) rise at least linearly with value.
- jessriedel 15y agoFine, so it's a (n/p) times 1% tax, where p is the average chance of victory and n is the average number of years in court for each suit. This doesn't seem to change the structure of the incentives at all; it's just a tax on patent infringement damages. I find the non-retroactive possibility much more interesting.
- beagle3 15y agoI don't disagree a non-retroactive possibility might be better; I just haven't been able to reach a conclusion about it. And, it is more than just a tax on patent infringement damages - because you have to pay the tax upfront, which makes a big difference in cashflow. eolas's $600M verdict against Microsoft, and i4i's $400M verdict would both require posting $6M / $4M per year respectively in never-to-be-recouped taxes, which is a huge sum for the companies in question, and would probably have made them not sue. Furthermore, it involves the IRS in valuations, which is a good thing (because it is much harder to mess with the IRS) - manipulation of the value of a patent would have to be explained, and not arbitrary to avoid taxes. Anyway, we could all dream - it is the lobbyists that write the laws, and the patent holders have thousands of them in DC.
- cabalamat 15y ago> Any system in which the value of the patent is potentially infinite (as in the current system) is materially broken, and it is just a matter of time until someone finds a way to game it (non practicing patent trolls). Incidently, patent trolls are not a new phenomenon: Elias Howe was on in the 19th century. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_26-2009_05_02.shtml#1240974253 http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_26-2009_05_02.sht...