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To clarify: they can't adjust the value retroactively, right? If you find out someone is profiting from your patent in 2011 which you valued at zero the beginn
by jessriedel 15y ago
To clarify: they can't adjust the value retroactively, right? If you find out someone is profiting from your patent in 2011 which you valued at zero the beginning of that year, you have to wait until 2012 to re-value (and potentially sue them), correct?
- beagle3 15y agoTo clarify: the declared value puts a _maximum_ on awarded damages, but does not make it in any way automatic (even if the product is found infringing). My proposal is that it is set retroactively one year back: when you file your 2011 taxes (on April 2012 at the latest), you would assign a value for it for 2011, and pay it at that point. If you sue (or even threat to sue) someone in 2011 before paying the tax, that is an admission of tax liability - if you declare less at the end of the year, that's grounds for the IRS to audit you and assume your highest estimate during the year (as shown in the threat to sue) sets your tax, and anything else is automatic assumption of tax evasion. A future-looking only assessment is also possible; but in that case, you have to be able to set the value (and pay the tax) on a monthly basis -- otherwise, it calls for anyone who is willfully infringing to wait until 1-jan, ask for the IP value, and if it is less than they expected to pay, have a year of "free" use. My proposal is an attempt to sort-of balance the existing state of affairs -- if at the end of the year, you didn't manage to license it to anyone, you shouldn't be taxed for what you thought it is worth.
- jessriedel 15y agoI don't get it then. If my company holds a huge portfolio of patents, and we sue for $X damages on some subset of them in a given year, we will simply value those patents at $X and the rest at zero. Then we recover $X in damages, and pay 1% of X in taxes. In other words, doesn't this just reduce to a 1% tax on patent damages? (Even if we think we'll only recover on average p% of our claims, we still only pay 1% of X in taxes to get p% of X in damages. Assuming p% is closer to 50% than 1%, not much changes.)
- beagle3 15y agoNo, it does not reduce to 1%. At worst, it will reduce to (1/p)% (with p<1, you assume p=~0.5), but probably much, much more: All of these processes realistically take months to years (have you noticed how long SCO vs. Novell was going on?) - if you "deactivate" a subset while you're still suing, that reduces your damages. So, you'll have to keep it active, say three years - which with p=0.5 makes it a 6% tax on damages. However, it does chill the chilling effect - right now, e.g. Microsoft has ~20,000 patents, and they can sue anyone for anything. This way, they will actively have to choose strategically what they want to enforce. Finally, and I think I haven't made this clear enough, I don't think my proposal is a GOOD patent system in any way. It is bad. But it is not as bad as the existing system, and (I suspect) it has a much better chance of passing than a complete reform. Furthermore, it stops some of the (currently legal) tax loops that involve passing patents among shell corporations. The basic idea is to align value with cost. Any system in which the value of the patent is potentially infinite (as in the current system) is materially broken, and it is just a matter of time until someone finds a way to game it (non practicing patent trolls). Any sane system must have cost (of patent, property, copyright, etc) rise at least linearly with value.
- jessriedel 15y agoFine, so it's a (n/p) times 1% tax, where p is the average chance of victory and n is the average number of years in court for each suit. This doesn't seem to change the structure of the incentives at all; it's just a tax on patent infringement damages. I find the non-retroactive possibility much more interesting.
- beagle3 15y agoI don't disagree a non-retroactive possibility might be better; I just haven't been able to reach a conclusion about it. And, it is more than just a tax on patent infringement damages - because you have to pay the tax upfront, which makes a big difference in cashflow. eolas's $600M verdict against Microsoft, and i4i's $400M verdict would both require posting $6M / $4M per year respectively in never-to-be-recouped taxes, which is a huge sum for the companies in question, and would probably have made them not sue. Furthermore, it involves the IRS in valuations, which is a good thing (because it is much harder to mess with the IRS) - manipulation of the value of a patent would have to be explained, and not arbitrary to avoid taxes. Anyway, we could all dream - it is the lobbyists that write the laws, and the patent holders have thousands of them in DC.