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It should be noted that Pearl Harbor has nothing to do with the decisive battle doctrine. Indeed, from a strategic perspective, Pearl Harbor actually ruined the

It should be noted that Pearl Harbor has nothing to do with the decisive battle doctrine. Indeed, from a strategic perspective, Pearl Harbor actually ruined the ability of the IJN to achieve a decisive battle, since the USN would be highly unlikely to risk any remaining fleet forces to seek the decisive battle that Japanese wanted, much less the Japanese model scenario of steaming en masse to somewhere near Japan. That illustrates the strategic incompetence of the IJN. They had, without a decisive battle, won control of the seas--which is why you want the decisive battle. But they didn't exploit their control of the seas (to some degree, they couldn't--the core interests of Britain and the US were outside of the range of Japan to plausibly threaten). And by the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN wrested control of the seas (at least around Guadalcanal) away from Japan--without a decisive battle, still--and used that to devastating effect: the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal was unable to be receive sufficient supplies because of it. And still, the Japanese fretted about not having their decisive battle. It's not for nothing that Pearl Harbor is often considered an example of simultaneous spectacular tactical success and ruinous strategic failure.

throwanem 5y ago
Not that you're wrong, but I don't believe I described Pearl Harbor as a strategic success; I was discussing the intent, rather than the outcome. I do think it's fair to describe Pearl as an attempt to reconcile the doctrine of decisive battle with the increasingly evident primacy of naval air power and the numerical and resource superiority of the US. I'll grant that a surprise strike on ships in port doesn't exactly qualify as battle per se, but it was certainly intended to be decisive, and in that circumstance waiting to receive an attack in the classic style doesn't work. As planned, the attack very well could have worked; after all, if the US fleet carriers had been at Pearl when the Japanese strike force arrived, the IJN could have counted on superiority in the Pacific until at least 1943. While in the long run that might still not have been enough, it would certainly have at least enabled them to consolidate gains and better prepare to receive US attacks in the Pacific, and in any case it's well documented that that was what they were going for.
- lucas_membrane 5y ago
  There are at least three reasons other than the oil tanks and carries at sea why attack was a failure: 1) the ships attacked were in shallow water. Most were salvaged or repaired. 2) Timing the attack for early Sunday maximized the advantage of surprise, but minimized the number of officers and sailors on the ships when attacked, so that loss of know-how was less than it might have been. 3) The US sent ships out to counter-attack the Japanese fleet based on radio direction finding, but the signals were mis-interpreted, and the counter-attack went in the exact opposite direction of the true direction of the Japanese fleet.
rjsw 5y ago
There has been a suggestion that Japan should have been more decisive at Pearl Harbor and invaded and occupied Hawaii. A recent blog post [1] analysed this idea. [1] http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-follow-up-invasion-plan.html http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-...
- throwanem 5y ago
  In advance of reading the post, but what an intriguing idea! I doubt they could have sustained an occupation force, though, not with their resource problems, not in advance of expansion across much of the Pacific. You'd have a general on the end of a hell of a long and skinny string, but you'd potentially pin down the entire US Pacific Fleet trying to deal with it and protect the response force...honestly, it's not impossible you could lose the entire invasion force and still achieve the strategic objective, if they held out long enough. And if any army in human history could do it, it'd be the IJA circa 1941, right? What a thought!
  - DrPhish 5y ago
    You may find Konpeki no Kantai [0] interesting as a thought experiment. Its quite a bit more broad-ranging than just a single question, and has a lot of Japanese nationalistic sentiment, but I don't think that detracts from it being an entertaining and thoughtful watch. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konpeki_no_Kantai https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konpeki_no_Kantai
lucas_membrane 5y ago
>> the USN would be highly unlikely to risk any remaining fleet forces to seek the decisive battle that Japanese wanted The USN risked their somewhat inferior (naval aviation and carrier) assets at Midway, and despite their intelligence advantage, knowing where the Japanese were going (as opposed to December 1941, when they expected an attack, but had no way of narrowing down the list of potential targets), won with the help of good fortune, which is usually a part of a victory. If the Japanese fleet had not been so damaged at Midway, the evacuation of civilians from Hawaii had already been planned to commence post haste, ...

throwanem 5y ago

Not that you're wrong, but I don't believe I described Pearl Harbor as a strategic success; I was discussing the intent, rather than the outcome. I do think it's fair to describe Pearl as an attempt to reconcile the doctrine of decisive battle with the increasingly evident primacy of naval air power and the numerical and resource superiority of the US. I'll grant that a surprise strike on ships in port doesn't exactly qualify as battle per se, but it was certainly intended to be decisive, and in that circumstance waiting to receive an attack in the classic style doesn't work. As planned, the attack very well could have worked; after all, if the US fleet carriers had been at Pearl when the Japanese strike force arrived, the IJN could have counted on superiority in the Pacific until at least 1943. While in the long run that might still not have been enough, it would certainly have at least enabled them to consolidate gains and better prepare to receive US attacks in the Pacific, and in any case it's well documented that that was what they were going for.

lucas_membrane 5y ago
There are at least three reasons other than the oil tanks and carries at sea why attack was a failure: 1) the ships attacked were in shallow water. Most were salvaged or repaired. 2) Timing the attack for early Sunday maximized the advantage of surprise, but minimized the number of officers and sailors on the ships when attacked, so that loss of know-how was less than it might have been. 3) The US sent ships out to counter-attack the Japanese fleet based on radio direction finding, but the signals were mis-interpreted, and the counter-attack went in the exact opposite direction of the true direction of the Japanese fleet.

rjsw 5y ago

There has been a suggestion that Japan should have been more decisive at Pearl Harbor and invaded and occupied Hawaii. A recent blog post [1] analysed this idea. [1] http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-follow-up-invasion-plan.html http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-...

throwanem 5y ago
In advance of reading the post, but what an intriguing idea! I doubt they could have sustained an occupation force, though, not with their resource problems, not in advance of expansion across much of the Pacific. You'd have a general on the end of a hell of a long and skinny string, but you'd potentially pin down the entire US Pacific Fleet trying to deal with it and protect the response force...honestly, it's not impossible you could lose the entire invasion force and still achieve the strategic objective, if they held out long enough. And if any army in human history could do it, it'd be the IJA circa 1941, right? What a thought!
- DrPhish 5y ago
  You may find Konpeki no Kantai [0] interesting as a thought experiment. Its quite a bit more broad-ranging than just a single question, and has a lot of Japanese nationalistic sentiment, but I don't think that detracts from it being an entertaining and thoughtful watch. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konpeki_no_Kantai https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konpeki_no_Kantai

lucas_membrane 5y ago

>> the USN would be highly unlikely to risk any remaining fleet forces to seek the decisive battle that Japanese wanted The USN risked their somewhat inferior (naval aviation and carrier) assets at Midway, and despite their intelligence advantage, knowing where the Japanese were going (as opposed to December 1941, when they expected an attack, but had no way of narrowing down the list of potential targets), won with the help of good fortune, which is usually a part of a victory. If the Japanese fleet had not been so damaged at Midway, the evacuation of civilians from Hawaii had already been planned to commence post haste, ...