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I disagree that this will help, because the established companies the pledge would apply to are a secondary problem and mostly seem to fight each other (has Mic
by beagle3 15y ago
I disagree that this will help, because the established companies the pledge would apply to are a secondary problem and mostly seem to fight each other (has Microsoft asserted patents against a startup? has IBM? has AT&T? when they asserted patents it was against multi-million dollar businesses!). The primary problem is patent trolls (see e.g. lodsys / intellectual ventures) for whom this pledge could be considered self-harm.
I will quote myself from [ http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2855835 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2855835 ] here for another solution, one that actually can _easily_ go through government (except for the intense lobbying against it by whoever enjoys the current patent regime); you can read there for some discussion if it is interesting. Quoth myself (with minor editing):
Intellectual "Property Tax". Have everyone declare the value of their intellectual "property" (patents, copyrights, trademarks) - each and every item, for that year, on their tax return, and have them pay 1% of the value as "IP tax", per year.
Clarification: you can set a different value every year. The value may drop to zero because a competitor's patent solves the problem better; or it may go up because it becomes essential to something that becomes commonplace.
That amount is what one pays for a compulsory license or if successfully sued, and up to 3 times that for willful infringement, per year -- and no more. (But of course, a patent owner can always negotiate a lower payment, as is done with music recordings that have compulsory license agreements)
All of a sudden, everyone has an incentive to state a reasonable value for their patent. Copyright catalogs that are not being published (old music recordings, old books, old movies) would be assigned 0 value by copyright holder, to avoid tax - which means anyone can freely make a copy. If they believe -- at the end of the year -- that someone is making a profit at their expense, they can set the value as high as they want at the end of that year, pay the tax, and sue the profiteer.
Simple, elegant, and coffer filling.
edit: put missing link
edit: added clarification about setting value each year anew.
- veyron 15y agoEveryone will game the IP tax by valuing it at pennies -- after all, they may not directly be using it may not have a fair market value before they take someone to court. As a real-life example of people gaming these types of taxes, people buy expensive (>100K USD) cars in europe directly (i.e. taking delivery in stuttgart) to save on the sales tax: driving it around for a bit ensures that the car is technically "used" when brought back here, circumventing new car taxes.
- defen 15y agoI haven't thought through OP's proposal, but your objection is covered - by valuing a patent at pennies, a company would cause compulsory licenses/willful infringment penalties to also be worth pennies.
- veyron 15y agoNo but the taxes would have to be paid only after a successful patent case. The point is that the patent has no real market price until the first successful willful infringement penalty. Until that point, the price is arbitrary.
- beagle3 15y agoUntil _before_ a patent case. The taxes are what gives you the ability to sue (and a limit to the damage you can be awarded), and there is no guarantee you will win your case of that your patent will not be invalidated. Again, you have to pay the tax _before_ you can sue, and then you can only sue for the value reflected by the tax for that year, no more (and you are still subject to invalidation, etc).
- metajack 15y agoI think that the idea is that if you declare the taxable value, then later try to sue someone for a much higher value, then you've now committed fraud against the IRS. Of course, the easy work around to this is the claim that it's value increased suddenly when the patent became more useful; you start paying more tax when you start suing others. Considering that low maintenance costs don't prevent domain squatting, I'm not sure this would be an effective tactic to prevent lots of silly patents.
- SoftwarePatent 15y agoWe can't get patent reform through Congress, so let's try to get a new tax through Congress? DOA.
- beagle3 15y agoYou need a carrot for Congress. Right now, a patent reform (of the kind HN would generally like) will: a) reduce government intake in the form of patent registration and maintenance fees b) get all the lobbyists employed by current patent holders (who spend billions of dollars on those patents) working against you. Why on earth would congress do something like that? So that 0.05% of the population that actually has any idea how bad it is would rejoice? (If your answer is "to improve american competitiveness" or something like that -- well, you have no idea how congress works) However, if you can get a new spending source, you just have the lobbyist problem to take care of.
- robryan 15y agoImproves innovation which will eventually lead to more tax dollars. Although it would be a stretch to get them to take a long term view, would also probably have lawyers lobby against it.
- jessriedel 15y agoTo clarify: they can't adjust the value retroactively, right? If you find out someone is profiting from your patent in 2011 which you valued at zero the beginning of that year, you have to wait until 2012 to re-value (and potentially sue them), correct?
- beagle3 15y agoTo clarify: the declared value puts a _maximum_ on awarded damages, but does not make it in any way automatic (even if the product is found infringing). My proposal is that it is set retroactively one year back: when you file your 2011 taxes (on April 2012 at the latest), you would assign a value for it for 2011, and pay it at that point. If you sue (or even threat to sue) someone in 2011 before paying the tax, that is an admission of tax liability - if you declare less at the end of the year, that's grounds for the IRS to audit you and assume your highest estimate during the year (as shown in the threat to sue) sets your tax, and anything else is automatic assumption of tax evasion. A future-looking only assessment is also possible; but in that case, you have to be able to set the value (and pay the tax) on a monthly basis -- otherwise, it calls for anyone who is willfully infringing to wait until 1-jan, ask for the IP value, and if it is less than they expected to pay, have a year of "free" use. My proposal is an attempt to sort-of balance the existing state of affairs -- if at the end of the year, you didn't manage to license it to anyone, you shouldn't be taxed for what you thought it is worth.
- jessriedel 15y agoI don't get it then. If my company holds a huge portfolio of patents, and we sue for $X damages on some subset of them in a given year, we will simply value those patents at $X and the rest at zero. Then we recover $X in damages, and pay 1% of X in taxes. In other words, doesn't this just reduce to a 1% tax on patent damages? (Even if we think we'll only recover on average p% of our claims, we still only pay 1% of X in taxes to get p% of X in damages. Assuming p% is closer to 50% than 1%, not much changes.)
- beagle3 15y ago
- deleted 15y ago[deleted]
- A1kmm 15y agoThe biggest problem with the patent system is it discourages people from using patented ideas - the more patented ideas you use in your product (even if you independently discover them), the more you pay. A good patent system would have the following properties: * Investment and risk taking in R&D and sharing the results is rewarded above the costs of that R&D, so there is no disincentive to share with competitors. * There is no disincentive to using and building on ideas shared by others. I think the best system is a 'tax'-like system - alongside the existing patent system, businesses can elect to pay 10% of their revenues to a pool for immunity from all patents. Businesses using / reselling patented manufactured products are still liable even if the manufacturer pays the 10%, unless they also pay the 10%. Patent filers tell the pool the actual costs of R&D (and may be audited to prove it). The pool is distributed based to patent filers based on R&D costs (and maybe a per-industry factor for risk) - it might be better to somehow collect some rough metric of value of the each patent to their business from patent users, although there are risks of the system being gamed then. This system would achieve the desired properties at 10% of all industry-wide research being spent on R&D - it would favour not disclosing R&D worth more than 10%, and if less than 10% was spent, it would be stacked in favour of companies doing R&D.
- Hyena 15y agoThe problems people note are solvd if you issue a patent free for a short time, like 3 years, and then auction a much smaller number of extensions to that term. This creates a pricing maximum for years 4 to whenever.