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> One has to wonder whether the Japanese would have thought up this strategy (or considered it feasible) had the Americans not practiced it and proved it for th

> One has to wonder whether the Japanese would have thought up this strategy (or considered it feasible) had the Americans not practiced it and proved it for them. I don't think one does. The imperial Japanese planning staff had strongly favored the doctrine of decisive battle since at least the Tsushima Strait, when it worked splendidly for them against the Russian imperial navy - a much weaker adversary than the US, true, but this was well understood and only made more pointed the need to immediately disable the US navy's ability to conduct significant operations in the intended sphere of Japanese imperial influence. Too, it's not as if the Imperial Japanese general staff was anything less than world-class. The British made the mistake of assuming otherwise, even ignoring reports from their own observers that Japan needed to be taken seriously as an opponent. That mistake cost them Singapore and Malaya at the outset of the war, and depending on whose arguments you buy, eventually India as well. In light of that and other related history, it verges upon the absurd to repeat the mistake now. (Really, it was entirely the other way around from what you're positing here; rather than the IJN taking a cue from US war games, we followed the Pearl Harbor attack with our entirely symbolic "Doolittle Raid" on Tokyo a year later.)

jcranmer 5y ago
It should be noted that Pearl Harbor has nothing to do with the decisive battle doctrine. Indeed, from a strategic perspective, Pearl Harbor actually ruined the ability of the IJN to achieve a decisive battle, since the USN would be highly unlikely to risk any remaining fleet forces to seek the decisive battle that Japanese wanted, much less the Japanese model scenario of steaming en masse to somewhere near Japan. That illustrates the strategic incompetence of the IJN. They had, without a decisive battle, won control of the seas--which is why you want the decisive battle. But they didn't exploit their control of the seas (to some degree, they couldn't--the core interests of Britain and the US were outside of the range of Japan to plausibly threaten). And by the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN wrested control of the seas (at least around Guadalcanal) away from Japan--without a decisive battle, still--and used that to devastating effect: the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal was unable to be receive sufficient supplies because of it. And still, the Japanese fretted about not having their decisive battle. It's not for nothing that Pearl Harbor is often considered an example of simultaneous spectacular tactical success and ruinous strategic failure.
- throwanem 5y ago
  Not that you're wrong, but I don't believe I described Pearl Harbor as a strategic success; I was discussing the intent, rather than the outcome. I do think it's fair to describe Pearl as an attempt to reconcile the doctrine of decisive battle with the increasingly evident primacy of naval air power and the numerical and resource superiority of the US. I'll grant that a surprise strike on ships in port doesn't exactly qualify as battle per se, but it was certainly intended to be decisive, and in that circumstance waiting to receive an attack in the classic style doesn't work. As planned, the attack very well could have worked; after all, if the US fleet carriers had been at Pearl when the Japanese strike force arrived, the IJN could have counted on superiority in the Pacific until at least 1943. While in the long run that might still not have been enough, it would certainly have at least enabled them to consolidate gains and better prepare to receive US attacks in the Pacific, and in any case it's well documented that that was what they were going for.
  - lucas_membrane 5y ago
    There are at least three reasons other than the oil tanks and carries at sea why attack was a failure: 1) the ships attacked were in shallow water. Most were salvaged or repaired. 2) Timing the attack for early Sunday maximized the advantage of surprise, but minimized the number of officers and sailors on the ships when attacked, so that loss of know-how was less than it might have been. 3) The US sent ships out to counter-attack the Japanese fleet based on radio direction finding, but the signals were mis-interpreted, and the counter-attack went in the exact opposite direction of the true direction of the Japanese fleet.
- rjsw 5y ago
  There has been a suggestion that Japan should have been more decisive at Pearl Harbor and invaded and occupied Hawaii. A recent blog post [1] analysed this idea. [1] http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-follow-up-invasion-plan.html http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-...
  - throwanem 5y ago
lucas_membrane 5y ago
> Entirely symbolic FDR had been advised by an expert that an early attack on the home islands would do important damage to Japanese morale by deflating the myth that their military war-cabinet regime was not putting any civilians at risk.

jcranmer 5y ago

It should be noted that Pearl Harbor has nothing to do with the decisive battle doctrine. Indeed, from a strategic perspective, Pearl Harbor actually ruined the ability of the IJN to achieve a decisive battle, since the USN would be highly unlikely to risk any remaining fleet forces to seek the decisive battle that Japanese wanted, much less the Japanese model scenario of steaming en masse to somewhere near Japan. That illustrates the strategic incompetence of the IJN. They had, without a decisive battle, won control of the seas--which is why you want the decisive battle. But they didn't exploit their control of the seas (to some degree, they couldn't--the core interests of Britain and the US were outside of the range of Japan to plausibly threaten). And by the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN wrested control of the seas (at least around Guadalcanal) away from Japan--without a decisive battle, still--and used that to devastating effect: the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal was unable to be receive sufficient supplies because of it. And still, the Japanese fretted about not having their decisive battle. It's not for nothing that Pearl Harbor is often considered an example of simultaneous spectacular tactical success and ruinous strategic failure.

throwanem 5y ago
Not that you're wrong, but I don't believe I described Pearl Harbor as a strategic success; I was discussing the intent, rather than the outcome. I do think it's fair to describe Pearl as an attempt to reconcile the doctrine of decisive battle with the increasingly evident primacy of naval air power and the numerical and resource superiority of the US. I'll grant that a surprise strike on ships in port doesn't exactly qualify as battle per se, but it was certainly intended to be decisive, and in that circumstance waiting to receive an attack in the classic style doesn't work. As planned, the attack very well could have worked; after all, if the US fleet carriers had been at Pearl when the Japanese strike force arrived, the IJN could have counted on superiority in the Pacific until at least 1943. While in the long run that might still not have been enough, it would certainly have at least enabled them to consolidate gains and better prepare to receive US attacks in the Pacific, and in any case it's well documented that that was what they were going for.
- lucas_membrane 5y ago
  There are at least three reasons other than the oil tanks and carries at sea why attack was a failure: 1) the ships attacked were in shallow water. Most were salvaged or repaired. 2) Timing the attack for early Sunday maximized the advantage of surprise, but minimized the number of officers and sailors on the ships when attacked, so that loss of know-how was less than it might have been. 3) The US sent ships out to counter-attack the Japanese fleet based on radio direction finding, but the signals were mis-interpreted, and the counter-attack went in the exact opposite direction of the true direction of the Japanese fleet.
rjsw 5y ago
There has been a suggestion that Japan should have been more decisive at Pearl Harbor and invaded and occupied Hawaii. A recent blog post [1] analysed this idea. [1] http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-follow-up-invasion-plan.html http://rethinkinghistory.blogspot.com/2021/06/pearl-harbour-...
- throwanem 5y ago

lucas_membrane 5y ago

> Entirely symbolic FDR had been advised by an expert that an early attack on the home islands would do important damage to Japanese morale by deflating the myth that their military war-cabinet regime was not putting any civilians at risk.