2 ms·
When it comes to side-channel attacks, process boundaries aren't adequate either. Rowhammer, Meltdown/Spectre, and friends show that handily, and the RSA key le
by throw10920 5y ago
When it comes to side-channel attacks, process boundaries aren't adequate either. Rowhammer, Meltdown/Spectre, and friends show that handily, and the RSA key leakage attack using SDR shows that even machine isolation isn't going to be enough for some things.
I guess that the idea that trusted compilers are the way forward is predicated on the assumption that we've managed to mitigate most/all side-channel attacks, because there really isn't much you can do about those otherwise.
- naasking 5y agoThose side channels existed because because they very clearly violated process isolation. Of course processes aren't going to isolate if your hardware ignores your isolation boundaries. Enforcing this kind of isolation in software will likely be quite difficult though.