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We will always need process boundaries to separate information domains, because side-channel vulnerabilities are not addressed by having a "trusted" compile ste
by zozbot234 5y ago
We will always need process boundaries to separate information domains, because side-channel vulnerabilities are not addressed by having a "trusted" compile step.
- throw10920 5y agoWhen it comes to side-channel attacks, process boundaries aren't adequate either. Rowhammer, Meltdown/Spectre, and friends show that handily, and the RSA key leakage attack using SDR shows that even machine isolation isn't going to be enough for some things. I guess that the idea that trusted compilers are the way forward is predicated on the assumption that we've managed to mitigate most/all side-channel attacks, because there really isn't much you can do about those otherwise.
- naasking 5y agoThose side channels existed because because they very clearly violated process isolation. Of course processes aren't going to isolate if your hardware ignores your isolation boundaries. Enforcing this kind of isolation in software will likely be quite difficult though.
- lisper 5y agoWhy can't a trusted compiler prevent side-channel attacks? All you need to do is prevent the code from accessing the side channel. It seems to me that doing this at compile time would actually be easier than doing it at run time.
- sfink 5y agoIt is easy. You just have to forbid access to timers and loops. Where "timers" include anything that can count and store the count in shared memory. Alternatively, you could forbid branches (and therefore loops, implicitly).
- lisper 5y agoI presume that was meant to be facetious? But a clock is not the thing you would prevent access to. The thing you would prevent access to is whatever it is you want to try to time using that clock.
- leni536 5y agoIf you can use a loop for timing then you can use an unrolled loop for timing too.
- GekkePrutser 5y agoBut if you forbid those things, what's left? Loops and branches are what code is made of.
- titzer 5y agoA key side-channel is execution time, and no, in general, you can't prevent a program from getting a clock. Even without a clock, one can construct one easily using shared memory and threads. Clocks are also easy to find. Even with low resolution clocks, timing differences can be amplified programmatically, making them observable.
- lisper 5y agoThe clock is not the thing you would prevent access to. The thing you would prevent access to is whatever it is you want to try to time using that clock.