5 ms·

Bitwarden uses end-to-end encryption. So you don't have to trust them as much as Google.

by jyscao 5y ago

ameliaquining 5y ago
Chrome also offers the option to use end-to-end encryption.
theamk 5y ago
um, no? See the famous story of Hushmail [0], which used end-to-end encryption and claimed to have no access to user email until receiving a court order. Then they modified the code they send to one client to exfiltrate encryption keys to law enforcement, and decoded all the "end to end encrypted" email. Sure, they claim they are open source and that the infrastructure was audited, but this does not prevent them from just configuring their auto-update server to serve a very special update to user at a specific IP. [0] https://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/ https://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/
- jyscao 5y ago
  Alright, that's fair. Guess self-hosting is the only foolproof approach for complete privacy then.
  - Tom4hawk 5y ago
    It was always like that. If your threat model is three letter agency/Mossad/etc than you have very limited options. Relevant XKCD: https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/
- nonameiguess 5y ago
  How is this a knock against them in comparison to Google? Does Google not comply with court orders?
- sodality2 5y ago
  > Then they modified the code they send to one client to exfiltrate encryption keys to law enforcement, and decoded all the "end to end encrypted" email This is false. The decryption code was run on the server, which means the password was sent to the server briefly. Hushmail simply stored the password for a few accounts. No client code was modified nor any auto-update changed. In fact, if the criminals had used the Java applet, they'd likely have gotten away with it (assuming they didn't update it) >However, installing Java and loading and running the Java applet can be annoying. So in 2006, Hushmail began offering a service more akin to traditional web mail. Users connect to the service via a SSL (https:// https://) connection and Hushmail runs the Encryption Engine on their side. Users then tell the server-side engine what the right passphrase is and all the messages in the account can then be read as they would in any other web-based email account. >The rub of that option is that Hushmail has -- even if only for a brief moment -- a copy of your passphrase. As they disclose in the technical comparison of the two options, this means that an attacker with access to Hushmail's servers can get at the passphrase and thus all of the messages.

Bitwarden uses end-to-end encryption. So you don't have to trust them as much as Google.

by jyscao 5y ago

Bitwarden uses end-to-end encryption. So you don't have to trust them as much as Google.

ameliaquining 5y ago

Chrome also offers the option to use end-to-end encryption.

theamk 5y ago

um, no? See the famous story of Hushmail [0], which used end-to-end encryption and claimed to have no access to user email until receiving a court order. Then they modified the code they send to one client to exfiltrate encryption keys to law enforcement, and decoded all the "end to end encrypted" email. Sure, they claim they are open source and that the infrastructure was audited, but this does not prevent them from just configuring their auto-update server to serve a very special update to user at a specific IP. [0] https://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/ https://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/

jyscao 5y ago
Alright, that's fair. Guess self-hosting is the only foolproof approach for complete privacy then.
- Tom4hawk 5y ago
  It was always like that. If your threat model is three letter agency/Mossad/etc than you have very limited options. Relevant XKCD: https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/
nonameiguess 5y ago
How is this a knock against them in comparison to Google? Does Google not comply with court orders?
sodality2 5y ago
> Then they modified the code they send to one client to exfiltrate encryption keys to law enforcement, and decoded all the "end to end encrypted" email This is false. The decryption code was run on the server, which means the password was sent to the server briefly. Hushmail simply stored the password for a few accounts. No client code was modified nor any auto-update changed. In fact, if the criminals had used the Java applet, they'd likely have gotten away with it (assuming they didn't update it) >However, installing Java and loading and running the Java applet can be annoying. So in 2006, Hushmail began offering a service more akin to traditional web mail. Users connect to the service via a SSL (https:// https://) connection and Hushmail runs the Encryption Engine on their side. Users then tell the server-side engine what the right passphrase is and all the messages in the account can then be read as they would in any other web-based email account. >The rub of that option is that Hushmail has -- even if only for a brief moment -- a copy of your passphrase. As they disclose in the technical comparison of the two options, this means that an attacker with access to Hushmail's servers can get at the passphrase and thus all of the messages.