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> We're running an average of 3-5 years between protocol-level discoveries in TLS. Everyone knows the weakness with our current system isn't the protocol--it's

> We're running an average of 3-5 years between protocol-level discoveries in TLS. Everyone knows the weakness with our current system isn't the protocol--it's the "trusted" roots. There are upwards of 100 organizations that have roots installed on my computer and each of them is an attack surface. And it's frustrating because if I'm Google, there's no way I can protect myself from these other firm's security flaws. That is the part of SSL/TLS that needs to change. Getting certs from DNSSEC would be a good start...

tptacek 15y ago
Getting certs from DNSSEC is morally equivalent to getting them from X509 PKIs. Again: the problem we have is that the UX and policy for HTTPS/TLS is brittle, so that it's hard to recognize and even harder to react to misconfigurations like "we're trusting CAs who are not trustworthy". Faced with a policy and UX problem, someone needs to explain to me how a reasonable next step is to bake a new PKI into the core of the Internet. There is a reason the IETF-types are so gung-ho on DNSSEC. But it isn't that they know it's a sound replacement for the CA system. It's that it bothers them that DNS- the- protocol is insecure. And that's fine (I think their solution stands a good chance of making DNS even less secure, but whatever). But they shouldn't get to piggyback on other security issues to achieve their goal.