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Our current TLS PKI is already government controlled PKI. Several governments control their own certificate authorities. Perhaps it's better this way because at
by jeroenhd 5y ago
Our current TLS PKI is already government controlled PKI. Several governments control their own certificate authorities. Perhaps it's better this way because at least it's not just the American government, bit it's hardly an argument against the change.
I don't really see what the "1990s design" argument is all about. If we'd design such a system today, we'd get the same system with maybe some more JSON or a blockchain of sorts, centralised around a few profit-oriented companies. Look at DoH (the version with and without the intermediate proxy server) to see what I mean.
You're right that the idea of assumptions about CPU power for DNS servers are outdated, but with modern software that's hardly a problem. DNS servers already solve this problem in every existing DNSSEC server I know.
- tptacek 5y agoYes, we agree, DNS servers are fully capable of implementing modern cryptography. The problem is that the protocol is designed to assume they can't, and it's a series of creaky workarounds for that fact --- much of DNSSEC's jankiness comes from the protocol requirement for offline-only signers.
- jeroenhd 5y agoBut that's the thing, common server software already collapses that part of the protocol into a single operation for the query itself. To enable DNSSEC for most systems, you just tell your nameserver to sign the zone and copy the necessary keys over to your registrar. That's two commands in PowerDNS, one to sign the records and one to fetch the keys. In BIND it requires some manual key generation and config, but that's still hardly a challenge for someone who can manage their own DNS zones. CDS/CDNSKEY can automate the communication with the TLD provider, but that's completely optional. The real jankiness is hidden away in the bespoke implementations on the backend that are designed to have their own complex DNS logic. Those systems don't need to abide by the weird offline-signing DNSSEC standards at all, because there's no reason for them to be compatible with other servers unless you're glueing your own code to an existing server. The offline signing quirk also actually helps you if you use a master/slave DNS setup because you don't need to set up a complicated multi-keyed DNS system to have many resolvers serve your records; one place signs it, and the other servers just forward the responses. The client does nothing more complex than validating the chain of trust like we're already doing for every other part of our modern connections, and all the server needs to do is respond with the right records (be it signed responses or signed errors).