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> Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had fo
by sokoloff 5y ago
> Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes.
That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed.
The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column deflection. That obviously won’t work for the intended purpose of MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to excessive pitch up).
The checklist item for runaway trim is not “stop stab trim by deflecting control column” but rather “stop stab trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches”. Pilots who used the “deflect control column” technique contrary to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That’s pretty far from “0% pilot contribution” to the mishap IMO.
- slownews45 5y agoExcellent point. A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept, communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo. Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no good handoff around prior issues etc. I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane in its entire envelope? This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience etc) which was not really appropriate here.
- sokoloff 5y agoThere’s a genuine question as to whether someone with 240 hours should be holding the yoke of a jet airliner. For me, that answer is “hell no!” as we saw in Colgan 3407 (and others) which led to the FAA 1500-hour minimum for an ATP. At 240 hours, I couldn’t be trusted with a Bonanza.
- slownews45 5y agoYes, in the US we (now) think of 250 as too low. 1,500 is pretty dang high. Persoanlly, 500 - 1000 wouldn't be unreasonable in my view. Major airlines might still be at 3,000+ hours. Remember, it used to be in the US you could also fly as a FO with a commercial pilots license at 250 hours! FAA Commercial Pilot is 250 (50 of which need to be in powered airplane). https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/active-pilots/safety-and-technique/operations/commercial-pilot-certificate https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/active-pilots/safet... 50 hours behind the actual yoke? 200 lives 30,000 feet in the air? Overseas, some of the cadet / local pilot programs - you get pretty low time and/or connected pilots into the seat. "The committee noted that these deficiencies had been identified previously in training and reemerged during the accident flight. When the MCAS activated, it took the first officer four minutes to locate the proper checklist because he wasn’t familiar with required memory items. During training, the same pilot had shown unfamiliarity with Boeing and airline standard operating procedures and had weak aircraft handling skills, the report revealed. His training record reflected numerous deficiencies, including “major problems” controlling the aircraft." There is a reason Boeing initially said there might have been some pilot factors. They look at that memory item checklist, and think, trim problem, stab cutout memory item. In the US they have Capt Sully (glider / fighter pilots, lots of experience, with a strong FO) gliding a plane with two engines out to a safe landing. So human in the loop kind of works in the US. Could you program a computer for that? Probably, but not there yet. That said, I still blame Boeing to a large degree. If you are going to sell new planes to countries that have this type of system, you must design the plane for purpose. Ie, low time pilots who struggle / are connected / can't be fired etc - you don't then design the plane assuming the human in the loop will have hand flying ability to step in. That was pure greed, roll out this type of plane in the US / EU / UK etc. Good maintenance, good safety reporting systems (ASAP etc) work out the kinks, then go overseas. First Max 8 to Malindo air!!? Really?? They really need to get to airbus and beyond envelope protection etc in these markets. I'm also curious about checkrides overseas. Stuff like engine out on takeoff etc is just hammered into folks in the US.
- WalterBright 5y agoThe first Lion Air flight crew correctly followed the runaway trim procedure and landed safely. The next crew on the same airplane crashed. Boeing then issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive to ALL 737MAX PILOTS: "Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT." https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MAX-AD-1107.pdf https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA... which the EA pilots did not follow.
- sokoloff 5y agoET302 (the second crash) is worse in some ways. That crew correctly diagnosed the stab trim runaway, (eventually) executed the stab trim cutout procedure, got the aircraft somewhat under control (albeit still at full thrust), flew for a time, then (somewhat correctly) judged that unless they were going to pull power, they needed to use the electric stab trim (the manual trim was difficult to move because of the high airspeed), turned the stab trim back on and commanded electric nose-up trim (which the airplane did), then for some unknowable reason stopped commanding nose-up trim while leaving the stab trim powered, whereupon the aircraft MCAS commanded the final round of nose-down trim that they couldn’t overcome. They were this close to saving the airplane, had ID’d the issue, patched it, largely recovered control, and lost the airplane subsequent to that. (This is not meant to denigrate the crew. They were dealt a bad hand, including continuous stick shaker activation which surely added to confusion and likely led them to leave the thrust at max. Additionally, they were getting split airspeed and FD command bars for the crew. It’s frustrating how tantalizingly close they were to saving it even with those hurdles.) https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20190310-0 https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20190310-...
- kayfox 5y agoHopefully the final report on that crash will come out soon. It will probably be like the final report on the Lion Air crash where the training factors are downplayed in contrast to fixing blame on Boeing and noone else. I worry that this obsession with fixing only the hardware is the industry trying to sweep the training factors under the rug in hope that the current trend towards accidents being a result of serious training deficiencies will remain widely unnoticed.