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One of my previous employers was interested in this problem (I'm pretty sure the list of my previous employers is a matter of public record if you're curious en
by tialaramex 5y ago
One of my previous employers was interested in this problem (I'm pretty sure the list of my previous employers is a matter of public record if you're curious enough) and assigned me to look at the actual facts using raw DNS data from the network.
It was clear that somebody (presumably nation state actors, although likely not via the DNS hierarchy itself) tampers with DNS, in particular for military or "civil order" type authorities in certain countries. However, they don't usually bother using this to obtain a Web PKI certificate even though they easily could.
Can you guess why? What they want is credentials. So, hijack DNS answers for the mail server, user likely connects without TLS (or in a "fail open" setup supported by many mail clients so that TLS was abandoned once it didn't work) and you get their credentials - they don't even need to do anything, their mail client probably passively does this every few minutes while they sleep. But even for the web a lot of lay users don't type https://server.name.example/ https://server.name.example/ to reach the site, they just type server.name.example and the redirect secures it... until one day it doesn't. You'd notice. I'd notice. 99% of users would not notice, especially before browsers all added affirmative warnings in the last few years.