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Boeing also initially blamed pilots for 737 MAX crashes, until too many of them crashed, the regulators caught up and grounded the planes, and forced them to ta

Boeing also initially blamed pilots for 737 MAX crashes, until too many of them crashed, the regulators caught up and grounded the planes, and forced them to take responsibility. It seems like shifting the blame is the norm in the airline industry. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boeing-planes-unsafe-pilots-blamed-for-corporate-errors-in-max-737-crash https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-16/are-boein...

slownews45 5y ago
I thought Boeing blamed it on a combination of poor maintenance practices by the relevant airlines, poor handling and response to inflight error messages and maintenance requests on previous flights that left the issue unaddressed, and then weaknesses on the pilot side during the accident flights? I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised procedure memory items.
- smnrchrds 5y ago
  I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that Boeing had insisted no further training is required for pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification. Weakness of pilots was the direct result of this. Pilots having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact same as the previous one and no further training or testing is required or even available. They did just that, but actions which would have saved the plane in previous generations ensured its crash in the MAX generation. And Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. > In vivid detail, the documentary pieces together what Boeing knew about the potential for disaster with the 737 Max and when the company knew it. Pasternak says in the film that in 2012, a “Boeing test pilot was flying the MAX in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an activation of MCAS, and that resulted in what he described as a catastrophic event. It showed that if that had been in real life, he [could] have lost the airplane. They realize from that moment on, even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to MCAS.” > Yet internal communications explored in the film show that Boeing was determined to maintain the status quo: avoiding potential scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration that would add costs; keeping new simulator training for pilots to a minimum; and even requesting that MCAS be removed from pilot training manuals. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing-737-max-crashes-fatal-design-flaw-documentary/ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing...
  - sokoloff 5y ago
    > Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed. The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column deflection. That obviously won’t work for the intended purpose of MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to excessive pitch up). The checklist item for runaway trim is not “stop stab trim by deflecting control column” but rather “stop stab trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches”. Pilots who used the “deflect control column” technique contrary to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That’s pretty far from “0% pilot contribution” to the mishap IMO.
    - slownews45 5y ago
      Excellent point. A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept, communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo. Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no good handoff around prior issues etc. I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane in its entire envelope? This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience etc) which was not really appropriate here.
      - sokoloff 5y ago
        There’s a genuine question as to whether someone with 240 hours should be holding the yoke of a jet airliner. For me, that answer is “hell no!” as we saw in Colgan 3407 (and others) which led to the FAA 1500-hour minimum for an ATP. At 240 hours, I couldn’t be trusted with a Bonanza.
- WalterBright 5y ago
  The problems were: 1. poor MCAS design 2. poor maintenance 3. pilots not following runaway trim emergency procedures The media pretty much never mentions (3). Note that 3 flights experienced the MCAS malfunction. 1 applied runaway trim emergency procedures, continued with the flight, and landed safely. https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MAX-AD-1107.pdf https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA... 2018 - 035 - PK-LQP Final Report http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20...
  - WalterBright 5y ago
    For those who don't like what I wrote, I encourage you to read the cites, which are official documents, rather than what journalists who literally know nothing about flying, piloting, or aircraft design, imagine is true.
    - kayfox 5y ago
      I think the biggest lie I have seen the news on the MAX make "true" has been that MCAS exists to make the MAX fly like previous 737s and that it could have been omitted if the aircraft were a new type... Of course: 1. The MAX can't be a new type, it would have to be clean-sheet at that point just from all the grandfathered items. 2. That view grossly oversimplifies how type ratings work for pilots. 3. MCAS exists to conform to the FARs (control force curves), not some "make it fly like a 737NG" thing.
bobthepanda 5y ago
Shifting blame is the norm, period. Remember the coverage around Toyota’s stuck accelerators, or the woman who suffered third degree burns from McDonald’s coffee?

slownews45 5y ago

I thought Boeing blamed it on a combination of poor maintenance practices by the relevant airlines, poor handling and response to inflight error messages and maintenance requests on previous flights that left the issue unaddressed, and then weaknesses on the pilot side during the accident flights? I personally think they went a bit overboard with the revised procedure memory items.

smnrchrds 5y ago
I am no expert, but I remember the main culprit was that Boeing had insisted no further training is required for pilots to avoid some sort of expensive recertification. Weakness of pilots was the direct result of this. Pilots having experience with previous 737 planes were told in no uncertain terms that they can fly this new plane the exact same as the previous one and no further training or testing is required or even available. They did just that, but actions which would have saved the plane in previous generations ensured its crash in the MAX generation. And Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. > In vivid detail, the documentary pieces together what Boeing knew about the potential for disaster with the 737 Max and when the company knew it. Pasternak says in the film that in 2012, a “Boeing test pilot was flying the MAX in a flight simulator and trying to respond to an activation of MCAS, and that resulted in what he described as a catastrophic event. It showed that if that had been in real life, he [could] have lost the airplane. They realize from that moment on, even a Boeing test pilot may have trouble responding to MCAS.” > Yet internal communications explored in the film show that Boeing was determined to maintain the status quo: avoiding potential scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration that would add costs; keeping new simulator training for pilots to a minimum; and even requesting that MCAS be removed from pilot training manuals. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing-737-max-crashes-fatal-design-flaw-documentary/ https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/video-clip-boeing...
- sokoloff 5y ago
  > Boeing had the audacity of blaming the pilots when they inevitably died in crashes. That wasn’t a great look, but Boeing is correct that if the pilots had followed the existing checklist memory items for stab trim runaway, the airplanes would not have crashed. The difficulty is that prior generations had breakout switches which would inhibit the stab trim from running in a direction counter to the control column deflection. That obviously won’t work for the intended purpose of MCAS (to give flight control feel in opposition to excessive pitch up). The checklist item for runaway trim is not “stop stab trim by deflecting control column” but rather “stop stab trim by throwing the stab trim cutout switches”. Pilots who used the “deflect control column” technique contrary to the checklist would have gotten away with the error in non-Max 73s, but not in the -Max edition. That’s pretty far from “0% pilot contribution” to the mishap IMO.
  - slownews45 5y ago
    Excellent point. A lot of focus is on pilots, but the safety chain was also weak. Maint, communication with flight dept, communication to subsequent pilots etc, training dept and required experience / education to fly. Not a good combo. Someone with 200 hrs of time, plane badly maintained, no good handoff around prior issues etc. I still think Boeings safety model with humans as the backup for computers probably doesn't work in a world where a large majority of pilots lean on fully fly by wire (computerized) planes. Someone with 240 hours, a bunch of that just sim time - can they hand fly a plane in its entire envelope? This is where Boeing sounded really tone deaf. They built a model around humans as backup, a very US centric model (ie, folks with tons of general aviation experience just as a hobby from young ages, military flight experience etc) which was not really appropriate here.
    - sokoloff 5y ago
      There’s a genuine question as to whether someone with 240 hours should be holding the yoke of a jet airliner. For me, that answer is “hell no!” as we saw in Colgan 3407 (and others) which led to the FAA 1500-hour minimum for an ATP. At 240 hours, I couldn’t be trusted with a Bonanza.
WalterBright 5y ago
The problems were: 1. poor MCAS design 2. poor maintenance 3. pilots not following runaway trim emergency procedures The media pretty much never mentions (3). Note that 3 flights experienced the MCAS malfunction. 1 applied runaway trim emergency procedures, continued with the flight, and landed safely. https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MAX-AD-1107.pdf https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA... 2018 - 035 - PK-LQP Final Report http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20...
- WalterBright 5y ago
  For those who don't like what I wrote, I encourage you to read the cites, which are official documents, rather than what journalists who literally know nothing about flying, piloting, or aircraft design, imagine is true.
  - kayfox 5y ago
    I think the biggest lie I have seen the news on the MAX make "true" has been that MCAS exists to make the MAX fly like previous 737s and that it could have been omitted if the aircraft were a new type... Of course: 1. The MAX can't be a new type, it would have to be clean-sheet at that point just from all the grandfathered items. 2. That view grossly oversimplifies how type ratings work for pilots. 3. MCAS exists to conform to the FARs (control force curves), not some "make it fly like a 737NG" thing.

bobthepanda 5y ago

Shifting blame is the norm, period. Remember the coverage around Toyota’s stuck accelerators, or the woman who suffered third degree burns from McDonald’s coffee?