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I would add that the silly argument that a super-wealthy individual or a government could in theory degrade or destroy a transaction platform is applicable, not
by cs702 5y ago
I would add that the silly argument that a super-wealthy individual or a government could in theory degrade or destroy a transaction platform is applicable, not just to Algorand and other block chains, but also, more generally, to ANY transaction platform.
I mean, if Doctor Evil suddenly decided to spend tens of billions of dollars to destroy the three main credit card networks, he could probably do it. In fact, it might be easier and cheaper than attempting to degrade or bring down a distributed block chain network. The credit card networks are built upon many layers of ancient, pre-Internet technology, full of discoverable vulnerabilities and critical points-of-failure.
But we all know that it wouldn't happen. Doctor Evil would never want to do so, because even him, the most evil person in the world, would still want to be able to use his credit cards to eat out, go to the movies, and order stuff online. Also, he would never want to do something that would make him enemy #1 of every other person in the planet, including every other super-criminal!
What Doctor Evil actually wants to be able to do is figure out ways to steal or get balances from participants in the network without destroying the network: steal poorly protected wallets, hack into poorly secured exchanges, find ways to get blackmail payments on the network (e.g., by launching DoS attacks on the web), etc. The network itself is too useful to everyone for anyone to want to destroy it.
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PS. For the record: I have no economic connection to Algorand the block chain nor to Algorand the company, but I'm (superficially) familiar with some of Silvio Micali's past work and also, I know one of the company's top executives. In my judgement, the Algorand block chain has great technology, and Algorand the company has really great people. Their main challenge, as I see it, is overcoming the powerful network effects already accruing to other block chains.
- cblconfederate 5y agohe would in case of war
- teawrecks 5y agoIMO people listing things that discourage an attack (people will hate him, his credit cards won't work, etc) are just people trying to comfort themselves. It's like saying, "No one would break into my home because they might hurt themselves breaking in, or I might hurt them up, or they might get caught by the police and go to jail. It's just too risky." At the end of the day, Dr. Evil will gladly spend 10s of billions to destroy the network if doing so nets him 100s of billions. Stop listing reasons people won't attack the network and start listing reasons they would.
- cs702 5y agoThat's not what I said. Please don't attack a straw man. My main point was, and is, that the same attack-logic applies to ANY transaction network. The example with Doctor Evil was about other transaction networks. Why would Doctor Evil attack a block chain network when he could attack global/national/regional credit card/wire transfer/ACH networks, many of which are built upon ancient pre-Internet technology, are full of discoverable vulnerabilities and critical points-of-failure, and are operated by cash-rish financial institutions with liquid, easy-to-short stocks?
- zocoi 5y agoYou didn’t answer the parent post. Your point was, in game theory, there’s no benefit in attacking the network or the loss is huge that it doesn’t worth the the attack. The parent post gave the counter point that there could be a benefit which we haven’t thought. If Dr Evil is heavily invested in 2 network, he might destroy one to focus on the remaining. The chance of the attack is low but it is not zero
- md_ 5y agoI like this point, but (as I think you are saying as well) it’s true for POW as well, right? Fundamentally, if there are off-chain incentives to destroy the value of a given blockchain, much of our reasoning about the game theory doesn’t hold up.
- cs702 5y agoI addressed it in the first paragraph of my comment above. Let me quote from it here: The theoretical attack argument is indeed "applicable, not just to Algorand and other block chains, but also, more generally, to ANY transaction platform" -- VISA, Mastercard, Amex, ACH, Fedwire, etc. No one disagrees that it is applicable, i.e., a theoretical threat, to all transaction platforms. Now, if you think such an attack is an important problem for block chains, then you must also think it is an important problem for all legacy transaction networks. Yet we're all comfortable using our credit cards and bank accounts every day, and for virtually all practical purposes, we don't worry about a "Doctor Evil scenario." Why should we think and behave differently for block chain networks? Moreover, as I wrote before, in practice, legacy transaction networks (like, say, regional VISA networks run by 100-year-old banks) are easier and cheaper to attack. If the Doctor Evil scenario were a real threat, it would be more profitable for him to target one of the legacy networks!
- Siira 5y agoProvided a shorting mechanism for X, destroying X will be incentivized.
- itsoktocry 5y agoEverything already has a shorting mechanism. Can you cite a single instance where short-selling has destroyed a legitimate business, ever? This irrational fear of short selling is such a modern midwit view. There is way more value to fraud on the upside then there is on the downside, and we see that everyday.
- dahak27 5y agoThe analogy to companies doesn't work because there isn't a legal mechanism by which you can make your short predictions come true. It's illegal to manipulate markets and most ways by which you could destroy a company (without spending more than you hope to gain) are also probably illegal. If you can think of any legal ones I'd be curious to hear If it were legal to take a short position in a company and then take actions which blew the company up AND there existed cost-effective ways to do so, then you would definitely have seen more legitimate companies taken down by short-attacks. In contrast, here you have an entity where (a) there isn't the same legal safeguards and (b) there exists a claimed cost-effective way to tank the entity after taking a short position If you disagree with (a) or (b) empirically then cool but it's clearly a totally different scenario to regular companies
- wahern 5y ago> Can you cite a single instance where short-selling has destroyed a legitimate business, ever? What kind of short-selling? For naked short selling I quickly found evidence: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273488 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273488 That's the predecessor of a paper cited from 2003 SEC testimony of Robert J. Shapiro published at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72303/rshapiro122403.htm#foot5 https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72303/rshapiro122403.htm..., which in turn may have been a related source for the Shapiro citation in a 2008 Time magazine article at https://web.archive.org/web/20080424032340/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1126706-3,00.html https://web.archive.org/web/20080424032340/http://www.time.c..., which I found via the Wikipedia article on naked short selling at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naked_short_selling#Claimed_effects_of_naked_shorting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naked_short_selling#Claimed_ef... That first paper describes a scheme whereby investors bought convertible warrants, used naked short selling to drive the stock price down, then covered by exercising their warrants. And apparently in many cases, as documented by the paper, this resulted in a delisting or even bankruptcy of the targeted firms.