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Do you think the natural game theoretic result might be "carbon havens"? Areas that have the worst carbon enforcement / corruption (so issuing certificates to
by xyzzy123 5y ago
Do you think the natural game theoretic result might be "carbon havens"?
Areas that have the worst carbon enforcement / corruption (so issuing certificates to avoid tariffs etc without real action) would be more competitive than areas with effective enforcement so they will attract the most manufacturing.
I don't think importing from countries without a carbon price will be a problem (border taxes seem like they can work).
I suspect the problem will be that for countries that DO set a carbon price it is in everyone's interest within that country that the system not actually be effective.
- pydry 5y agoIf high levels of fraud are detected other countries can just slap high "emergency" tarriffs until the country fixes the problem. This would most certainly disincentivize lax enforcement. The problem has always been lack of a will, not a way.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- lovemenot 5y agoPerhaps this can work as strategic arms limitation treaties: trust but verify. Satellite monitoring is almost at the point where an individual country may be held accountable for emissions from their territory.