4 ms·

Condorcet methods perform, at best, only a little better than approval voting in computer simulations. And they have only ever been used in one US city (Marquet

Condorcet methods perform, at best, only a little better than approval voting in computer simulations. And they have only ever been used in one US city (Marquette, MI) which shortly thereafter repealed it. And they are radically more complicated and unlikely to ever see the light of day. https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html

dragonwriter 5y ago
> Condorcet methods perform, at best, only a little better than approval voting in computer simulations Computer simulations pretty universally paper over the main problem with approval compared to any ranked-ballot (whether forced or unforced preference) methods by pretending that “approval” has a consistent, cross-voter meaning. (This is an even bigger problem with score-based methods than approval.) Personally, for simplicity and good enough single winner methods, I prefer Bucklin which is both better than and simpler to explain than IRV, but more critically I prefer minimizing single-winner elections. 5-member legislative districts using a candidate-centric proportional method like STV or the method that has the same relationship to it as Bucklin as to IRV, which AFAIK isn't a named method, would be far superior to any possible system with single-member districts, and basically neutralize districting as a lever for partisan advantage. Paramount executive elections with a parallel successor (e.g., US Presidential tickets, if they were directly elected, or state Gov/LtGov pairs) can even be made into phased single-winner systems to get some of the advantages of multiwinner systems (not proportionality, but you do get some ability to separate partisan and personal preference in the general election, and to thereby weaken incumbency advantage: basically, use any ranked ballots [0] single winner election for the top spot, eliminate the winner, and rerun the election on the same ballots with the same method for the constitutional successor.) [0] while I am not partial to them, approval or score systems could be used to; simple FPTP fails because it mean those who voted for the top winner have no voice in the designated successor.

dragonwriter 5y ago

> Condorcet methods perform, at best, only a little better than approval voting in computer simulations Computer simulations pretty universally paper over the main problem with approval compared to any ranked-ballot (whether forced or unforced preference) methods by pretending that “approval” has a consistent, cross-voter meaning. (This is an even bigger problem with score-based methods than approval.) Personally, for simplicity and good enough single winner methods, I prefer Bucklin which is both better than and simpler to explain than IRV, but more critically I prefer minimizing single-winner elections. 5-member legislative districts using a candidate-centric proportional method like STV or the method that has the same relationship to it as Bucklin as to IRV, which AFAIK isn't a named method, would be far superior to any possible system with single-member districts, and basically neutralize districting as a lever for partisan advantage. Paramount executive elections with a parallel successor (e.g., US Presidential tickets, if they were directly elected, or state Gov/LtGov pairs) can even be made into phased single-winner systems to get some of the advantages of multiwinner systems (not proportionality, but you do get some ability to separate partisan and personal preference in the general election, and to thereby weaken incumbency advantage: basically, use any ranked ballots [0] single winner election for the top spot, eliminate the winner, and rerun the election on the same ballots with the same method for the constitutional successor.) [0] while I am not partial to them, approval or score systems could be used to; simple FPTP fails because it mean those who voted for the top winner have no voice in the designated successor.