There are two ways to approach such findings. One is to think of birds/lobsters/octopuses as more cognitively complex, intelligent and such. The other is to thi

There are two ways to approach such findings. One is to think of birds/lobsters/octopuses as more cognitively complex, intelligent and such. The other is to think of ourselves as less so. Sometimes the latter probably is more true. By way of analogy... When I was a pup studying philosophy, we studied the "other minds problem." How do we know what others feel and experience? Are we sure they're not faking it? How well can we understand another's mind? It's an old problem, and the philosophical tradition of questions, answers and arguments are rather old and formulaic. I think newer thinking, both scientific and philosophical, tends to reverse the "problem." We understand others by forming a mental model of them, narrated with feelings and experiences. This is a lot like we understand ourselves. We really do understand ourselves much like we understand others. Same mechanisms, more or less, I think. Mental model of a person + constant narratives to explain choices, feelings and such. You can either think of this as a solution to the "other minds problem" or a further problem.