Getting an ID card checked by security at the door of a secure establishment allows the people inside that building to know that the holder truly is who they sa

Getting an ID card checked by security at the door of a secure establishment allows the people inside that building to know that the holder truly is who they say they are. Inside that space the person has access to confidential information and they do not need security to constantly verify their credentials. ..and yet ID cards can be copied and faked - so why do we do this? This model is how a fingerprint can be used as a shortcut to deliver certain privileges. The user must first pass security by entering their password, and then later numerous safety triggers are in place to require that password again. Meaning that once a person is validated a stand-in can be suitable rather than fully evaluating each and every time. Back to fingerprints: copying a fingerprint has numerous barriers that these exploits frequently ignore. First it needs to be the correct finger, it must be clear and complete enough to copy and finally it must be used at a time when the device will accept it. While such barriers may be insufficient for a secure environment, this approach provides more security than, for example, a person repeatedly entering a pincode into their phone through the day - something that is both easily observed and remembered (and worse too if it's a gestural passcode.) To relegate fingerprints as only this or that throws the baby out with the bathwater - appropriate rules and context can make it a useful security improvement over the status quo. That doesn't mean it's perfect or that it has to be.