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A teenager can do these attacks. Quit using boogeyman as excuses.
by goldenkey 5y ago
A teenager can do these attacks. Quit using boogeyman as excuses.
- unclebucknasty 5y ago>A teenager can do these attacks. Quit using boogeyman as excuses. This is exactly the kind of propaganda I'm referring to. We all know that sophisticated attacks exist, the attack surface is vast, and it is extraordinarily difficult to indefinitely secure that attack surface against determined adversaries. We also know that foreign adversaries, and not "teenagers", are responsible for the overwhelming number of these attacks. But, here we have an apologist for those actors who blames the victims and calls the simple identification of the criminals "using boogeymen as excuses". It's gaslighting propaganda that has a consistent quality, and its origin is not organic.
- staticassertion 5y agoIt might be underselling their capabilities by referring to them as teenagers, but you're overselling the difficulty - it is not extraordinarily difficult to deal with these attackers.
- unclebucknasty 5y ago>you're overselling the difficulty - it is not extraordinarily difficult to deal with these attackers. Of course you'd say that, because you're vastly underselling the difficulty. You're not accounting for the number of attack surfaces, the number of attack vectors, or variables that are outside of a firm's control, such as zero days in software from third party vendors. Many firms also deploy tons of legacy code that they depend on to operate their businesses, some of which may have been developed by vendors long gone and cannot be easily replaced. Social engineering attacks are also becoming vastly more sophisticated. In general, you're not accounting for the relentlessness of these actors. Sure, it's easy to mock a company when they are sniped over some low hanging fruit, but I've been on the front lines of having to deal with these types and it's nonstop cat and mouse. They only have to be right once and most small companies don't stand a chance. But, none of that is really the point. The real point is that the blame is not with the victims, but with the criminals and the nations who sponsor them So, we should respond accordingly, instead of accepting or regurgitating their victim-blaming propaganda. I know at least four people who work at companies that were attacked over the last few years. Two of them are small businesses that sustained devastating losses and lost time. The economics hurt all of us, raise prices and can cost lives. These are attacks on society's collective security. What's so hard about holding these criminials and their sponsors accountable?
- staticassertion 5y ago> Of course you'd say that, because you're vastly underselling the difficulty. Well, I don't really think so, obviously. And where you made an affirmative assertion ie: "it is extraordinarily hard" I just made a negative assertion "it isn't". I didn't qualify how hard it is. But regardless, > You're not accounting for I am. Been in infosec my whole career and well before it. Been a CEO of an infosec company for two years now. > number of attack surfaces, the number of attack vectors The major threats are the same for virtually every organization. Phishing and malware. Both have extremely effective measures that any organization can roll out: 1. U2F (unphishable credential) 2. Default-deny execution (99% of malware is dead, and you now control more of your attack surface) > such as zero days in software from third party vendors. You can defend against this in a number of ways as well. I do feel that vendors are often the weak link. > Many firms also deploy tons of legacy code that they depend on to operate their businesses, some of which may have been developed by vendors long gone and cannot be easily replaced. That was a mistake on their part. Even still, you don't have to replace it to make it safer. You can isolate it, build around it, etc. Not to mention, very little software is truly irreplaceable. > he real point is that the blame is not with the victims, but with the criminals and the nations who sponsor them OK but that's a different point than what you originally made. You stated that it is extremely difficult to defend against these attacks, I'm saying it isn't. Whether one should have to defend against them or not really wasn't your point, even if now you say it is. > wo of them are small businesses that sustained devastating losses and lost time. It's an awful thing. They have my sympathy. > What's so hard about holding these criminials and their sponsors accountable? Right, so, here's the deal. 1. Many of the breached companies are not really 'victims'. Instead it is their users who are victims. So we hold them accountable because it is their responsibility to not let their users' data get owned. That's on them. 2. We can't hold attackers accountable for a number of reasons. Maybe in a moral sense we can, but in a practical sense we have to take precautions. I would never blame an end user, a singular person, for getting owned. It's not their job to protect themselves from the world. I'll absolutely blame companies (ones with user data) who get owned because when you sign up for a company you're taking on a number of additional obligations and responsibilities.
- unclebucknasty 5y ago