Yes, approval voting is resistant to strategy. Here are Bayesian regret and VSE figures showing it performs excellently, generally better than IRV/RCV in all ki

Yes, approval voting is resistant to strategy. Here are Bayesian regret and VSE figures showing it performs excellently, generally better than IRV/RCV in all kinds of strategic scenarios. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/VSE5key https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/VSE5key Here's a mathematical proof that, even in the worst case scenario where 100% of voters are maximally strategic, approval voting elects the Condorcet winner (candidate who beats every rival head-to-head). https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW Moreover, in 422 of the 440 ranked choice voting elections since 2004, the winner was the candidate with the most first-place votes. So even if it was true that everyone would just bullet vote with approval voting, approval voting would still elect the same winner as RCV 96% of the time. At radically lower cost and complexity. https://clayshentrup.medium.com/bullet-voting-is-fine-52e6f22057a9 https://clayshentrup.medium.com/bullet-voting-is-fine-52e6f2...