3 ms·

Isn't the whole thing made up to fit observation though? Why is that any more arbitrary than, say, electromagnetism existing?

TheOtherHobbes 5y ago
It's an explanatory theory with a lot - a lot - of gaps. It has been extended with some nice predictions like the Higgs. But basically it's a Franken-patchwork of math glued together quite awkwardly. Because that is what it is. Literally. It was developed by thousands of grad students and their supervisors throwing math at the wall and keeping anything that matched observations. So there was a lot of random searching involved. What's missing is a central guiding metaphor. Relativity has one. In comparison, the Standard Model is very epicycle-ish tool for calculating Lagrangians with plenty of "Yes but" and "Except when".
- throwawaylinux 5y ago
  I'm not sure I quite explained myself, although I do appreciate the reply. See, I also don't see how one central guiding metaphor would be any less arbitrary than none, or ten metaphors. What I am asking is why would α = 0.0072973525693 be more of a problem than electromagnetism or the speed of light being constant or e=mc^2? If the fine structure constant was exactly 1 would that make it better? Why is 1 less arbitrary or more good? I understand the beauty in simplicity, fewer concepts or ideas, smaller formulas explaining more things, 1 being "nicer" than other numbers, etc. So I understand that aspect of goodness, so it is the connection to underlying observable reality I'm asking about. Because isn't it also arbitrary to think that if we could explain things in more beautiful ways then it would be a deeper understanding or closer to the truth?
  - abrichr 5y ago
    It sounds like you're asking why parsimony is desirable in science. From https://aeon.co/essays/are-scientific-theories-really-better-when-they-are-simpler https://aeon.co/essays/are-scientific-theories-really-better...: > The upshot is that there are three parsimony paradigms that explain how the simplicity of a theory can be relevant to saying what the world is like: > Paradigm 1: sometimes simpler theories have higher probabilities. > Paradigm 2: sometimes simpler theories are better supported by the observations. > Paradigm 3: sometimes the simplicity of a model is relevant to estimating its predictive accuracy. > These three paradigms have something important in common. Whether a given problem fits into any of them depends on empirical assumptions about the problem. Those assumptions might be true of some problems, but false of others. Although parsimony is demonstrably relevant to forming judgments about what the world is like, there is in the end no unconditional and presuppositionless justification for Ockham’s Razor.
    - throwawaylinux 5y ago
      I really hope it doesn't sound like that is what I'm asking. I went back and re-read what I wrote and it doesn't seem like that at all to me, but maybe I'm not a good writer.
      - abrichr 5y ago
        Perhaps I am the one who is not a good reader! Please also note that I am not a physicist or a mathematician. > What I am asking is why would α = 0.0072973525693 be more of a problem than electromagnetism or the speed of light being constant or e=mc^2? If the fine structure constant was exactly 1 would that make it better? Why is 1 less arbitrary or more good? α = 1 is less arbitrary / more good than α = 0.0072973525693 because the former requires fewer bits of information than the latter. Fewer bits => more parsimony. Similarly: > See, I also don't see how one central guiding metaphor would be any less arbitrary than none, or ten metaphors. 1 < 10, therefore if parsimony is desirable, 1 is better than 10.
        throwawaylinux 5y ago
        > if parsimony is desirable That is what I'm asking. However you want to define this or label it. The article says a whole lot as far as I can tell without really saying anything. Or at least not what I'm asking. The "paradigms" all start with "sometimes", and they don't seem to be backed by anything scientific beyond handwaving. I agree that if you had two theories that are equally expressive and accurate, all else being equal the simpler one would be preferable. That's not really what I'm asking about though. We do not have two equal theories one that requires the fine structure constant and the other which does not. We have a theory with a fine structure constant and lots of other things. The question is why is that "problematic"? We don't look at e=mc^2 and think that ^2 is problematic and think that it suggests there should be a simpler better theory without it. Why does alpha get singled out?

TheOtherHobbes 5y ago

It's an explanatory theory with a lot - a lot - of gaps. It has been extended with some nice predictions like the Higgs. But basically it's a Franken-patchwork of math glued together quite awkwardly. Because that is what it is. Literally. It was developed by thousands of grad students and their supervisors throwing math at the wall and keeping anything that matched observations. So there was a lot of random searching involved. What's missing is a central guiding metaphor. Relativity has one. In comparison, the Standard Model is very epicycle-ish tool for calculating Lagrangians with plenty of "Yes but" and "Except when".

throwawaylinux 5y ago
I'm not sure I quite explained myself, although I do appreciate the reply. See, I also don't see how one central guiding metaphor would be any less arbitrary than none, or ten metaphors. What I am asking is why would α = 0.0072973525693 be more of a problem than electromagnetism or the speed of light being constant or e=mc^2? If the fine structure constant was exactly 1 would that make it better? Why is 1 less arbitrary or more good? I understand the beauty in simplicity, fewer concepts or ideas, smaller formulas explaining more things, 1 being "nicer" than other numbers, etc. So I understand that aspect of goodness, so it is the connection to underlying observable reality I'm asking about. Because isn't it also arbitrary to think that if we could explain things in more beautiful ways then it would be a deeper understanding or closer to the truth?
- abrichr 5y ago
  It sounds like you're asking why parsimony is desirable in science. From https://aeon.co/essays/are-scientific-theories-really-better-when-they-are-simpler https://aeon.co/essays/are-scientific-theories-really-better...: > The upshot is that there are three parsimony paradigms that explain how the simplicity of a theory can be relevant to saying what the world is like: > Paradigm 1: sometimes simpler theories have higher probabilities. > Paradigm 2: sometimes simpler theories are better supported by the observations. > Paradigm 3: sometimes the simplicity of a model is relevant to estimating its predictive accuracy. > These three paradigms have something important in common. Whether a given problem fits into any of them depends on empirical assumptions about the problem. Those assumptions might be true of some problems, but false of others. Although parsimony is demonstrably relevant to forming judgments about what the world is like, there is in the end no unconditional and presuppositionless justification for Ockham’s Razor.
  - throwawaylinux 5y ago
    I really hope it doesn't sound like that is what I'm asking. I went back and re-read what I wrote and it doesn't seem like that at all to me, but maybe I'm not a good writer.
    - abrichr 5y ago
      Perhaps I am the one who is not a good reader! Please also note that I am not a physicist or a mathematician. > What I am asking is why would α = 0.0072973525693 be more of a problem than electromagnetism or the speed of light being constant or e=mc^2? If the fine structure constant was exactly 1 would that make it better? Why is 1 less arbitrary or more good? α = 1 is less arbitrary / more good than α = 0.0072973525693 because the former requires fewer bits of information than the latter. Fewer bits => more parsimony. Similarly: > See, I also don't see how one central guiding metaphor would be any less arbitrary than none, or ten metaphors. 1 < 10, therefore if parsimony is desirable, 1 is better than 10.
      - throwawaylinux 5y ago
        > if parsimony is desirable That is what I'm asking. However you want to define this or label it. The article says a whole lot as far as I can tell without really saying anything. Or at least not what I'm asking. The "paradigms" all start with "sometimes", and they don't seem to be backed by anything scientific beyond handwaving. I agree that if you had two theories that are equally expressive and accurate, all else being equal the simpler one would be preferable. That's not really what I'm asking about though. We do not have two equal theories one that requires the fine structure constant and the other which does not. We have a theory with a fine structure constant and lots of other things. The question is why is that "problematic"? We don't look at e=mc^2 and think that ^2 is problematic and think that it suggests there should be a simpler better theory without it. Why does alpha get singled out?