4 ms·
The main problem is that you don't have a strong way of establishing that you're talking to the real TPM. It does raise the bar from passive interception to har
by mjg59 5y ago
The main problem is that you don't have a strong way of establishing that you're talking to the real TPM. It does raise the bar from passive interception to hardware MITM, but it doesn't absolutely solve the problem
- brokenmachine 5y agoIt would if both the TPM and the chip talking to it use keys signed by the manufacturer. Then they could both verify the public signatures.
- cryptonector 5y agoA public key for a fixedTPM+fixedParent primary on the TPM could be stored "securely" (i.e., read-only) on the host side, and then you can do key exchange with the TPM using RSA key transport or ECDH. You can also use a shared secret, but storing a secret on the host side is even harder than storing a write-once (at factory), read-only PK.