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> No, it doesn’t. It basically just rejects by definition... Its been a little while since I've read the paper, but I don't think it's right to say that it rej

> No, it doesn’t. It basically just rejects by definition... Its been a little while since I've read the paper, but I don't think it's right to say that it rejects this conclusion by definition. Instead, it presents a situation where the reader's intuitions are intended to rebel at the thought that the system in question understands the symbols that it is manipulating. But yes, otherwise I agree with you that the argument then goes that, if this case has caused you to be skeptical about whether a symbol manipulation system could be conscious, you should be skeptical about whether other ones would be as well. There are, of course, some important limitations/objections. Two that come to mind are that 1) you might not think that the reader's intuitions about a situation have any metaphysical significance--they might just be wrong and 2) the Chinese Room example might just suggest that a particular kind of symbol manipulation system may not be conscious without supporting the much stronger claim that they can't be conscious. The fact that one can raise objections, though, doesn't mean that it isn't an important contribution to the philosophy of mind. If nothing else, I think Searle was right to point out that the example raises interesting questions about the usefulness of the Turing Test since, by hypothesis, the Chinese Room could pass it.

codeulike 5y ago
If nothing else, I think Searle was right to point out that the example raises interesting questions about the usefulness of the Turing Test since, by hypothesis, the Chinese Room could pass it. The other part of the thought experiment, apart from imagining the room, is to imagine how complex the turing test might be. When people imagine what a Turing Test conversation would look like, they frequently underestimate the conversation. I find Dennet's example of an imaginary Turing Test from Consciousness Explained to be a good counterexample: Judge: Did you hear about the Irishman who found a magic lamp? When he rubbed it a genie appeared and granted him three wishes. “I’ll have a pint of Guiness!” the Irishman replied and immediately it appeared. The Irishman eagerly set to sipping and then gulping, but the level of Guiness in the glass was always magically restored. After a while the genie became impatient. “Well, what about your second wish?” he asked. Replied the Irishman between gulps, “Oh well, I guess I’ll have another one of these.” CHINESE ROOM: Very funny. No, I hadn’t heard it– but you know I find ethnic jokes in bad taste. I laughed in spite of myself, but really, I think you should find other topics for us to discuss. J: Fair enough but I told you the joke because I want you to explain it to me. CR: Boring! You should never explain jokes. J: Nevertheless, this is my test question. Can you explain to me how and why the joke “works”? CR: If you insist. You see, it depends on the assumption that the magically refilling glass will go on refilling forever, so the Irishman has all the stout he can ever drink. So he hardly has a reason for wanting a duplicate but he is so stupid (that’s the part I object to) or so besotted by the alcohol that he doesn’t recognize this, and so, unthinkingly endorsing his delight with his first wish come true, he asks for seconds. These background assumptions aren’t true, of course, but just part of the ambient lore of joke-telling, in which we suspend our disbelief in magic and so forth. By the way we could imagine a somewhat labored continuation in which the Irishman turned out to be “right” in his second wish after all, perhaps he’s planning to throw a big party and one glass won’t refill fast enough to satisfy all his thirsty guests (and it’s no use saving it up in advance– we all know how stale stout loses its taste). We tend not to think of such complications which is part of the explanation of why jokes work. Is that enough? Dennett: “The fact is that any program that could actually hold up its end in the conversation depicted would have to be an extraordinary supple, sophisticated, and multilayered system, brimming with “world knowledge” and meta-knowledge and meta-meta-knowledge about its own responses, the likely responses of its interlocutor, and much, much more…. Maybe the billions of actions of all those highly structured parts produce genuine understanding in the system after all.”

codeulike 5y ago

If nothing else, I think Searle was right to point out that the example raises interesting questions about the usefulness of the Turing Test since, by hypothesis, the Chinese Room could pass it. The other part of the thought experiment, apart from imagining the room, is to imagine how complex the turing test might be. When people imagine what a Turing Test conversation would look like, they frequently underestimate the conversation. I find Dennet's example of an imaginary Turing Test from Consciousness Explained to be a good counterexample: Judge: Did you hear about the Irishman who found a magic lamp? When he rubbed it a genie appeared and granted him three wishes. “I’ll have a pint of Guiness!” the Irishman replied and immediately it appeared. The Irishman eagerly set to sipping and then gulping, but the level of Guiness in the glass was always magically restored. After a while the genie became impatient. “Well, what about your second wish?” he asked. Replied the Irishman between gulps, “Oh well, I guess I’ll have another one of these.” CHINESE ROOM: Very funny. No, I hadn’t heard it– but you know I find ethnic jokes in bad taste. I laughed in spite of myself, but really, I think you should find other topics for us to discuss. J: Fair enough but I told you the joke because I want you to explain it to me. CR: Boring! You should never explain jokes. J: Nevertheless, this is my test question. Can you explain to me how and why the joke “works”? CR: If you insist. You see, it depends on the assumption that the magically refilling glass will go on refilling forever, so the Irishman has all the stout he can ever drink. So he hardly has a reason for wanting a duplicate but he is so stupid (that’s the part I object to) or so besotted by the alcohol that he doesn’t recognize this, and so, unthinkingly endorsing his delight with his first wish come true, he asks for seconds. These background assumptions aren’t true, of course, but just part of the ambient lore of joke-telling, in which we suspend our disbelief in magic and so forth. By the way we could imagine a somewhat labored continuation in which the Irishman turned out to be “right” in his second wish after all, perhaps he’s planning to throw a big party and one glass won’t refill fast enough to satisfy all his thirsty guests (and it’s no use saving it up in advance– we all know how stale stout loses its taste). We tend not to think of such complications which is part of the explanation of why jokes work. Is that enough? Dennett: “The fact is that any program that could actually hold up its end in the conversation depicted would have to be an extraordinary supple, sophisticated, and multilayered system, brimming with “world knowledge” and meta-knowledge and meta-meta-knowledge about its own responses, the likely responses of its interlocutor, and much, much more…. Maybe the billions of actions of all those highly structured parts produce genuine understanding in the system after all.”