> I thought I addressed that pretty directly. "Attackers aren't random processes." -- but OK, feel free to be not convinced. I'm not convinced that you're bein

> I thought I addressed that pretty directly. "Attackers aren't random processes." -- but OK, feel free to be not convinced. I'm not convinced that you're being serious. I rejected that response because it's self-evidently absurd. There were twelve mandatory prerequisites I identified for successful exploitation and the vast majority of them are not under the influence of any attacker, no matter how non-random the hypothetical attacker is. Do you understand what happens when you're forced to multiply probabilities? How does this attacker acquire a functioning copy of this secondary hash algorithm, which for all you know is held at least as securely than Apple holds private keys for stuff like iOS cryptographic signing. How does that attacker change the mind of a person who would never import hard core porn into their phone's photo gallery? Do you know if Apple's human review requires fooling one reviewer or multiple? I personally have no idea but as someone who has implemented a human review system for critical data, placing such consequential decisions in the hands of a single human is a non-starter. For all you know, the 30 images will be looked at by 30 different human reviewers. How does the attacker ensure that ALL of them will overlook the absence of a PRE-PUBESCENT CHILD in the photograph? No sir, I do not think you are not being serious. And that's intended as a compliment, because you're clearly a smart person.