> Since my liking you is caused by my immediate environment, it isn't reducible to a weighted average of my history. It is not clear to me that this cannot be

> Since my liking you is caused by my immediate environment, it isn't reducible to a weighted average of my history. It is not clear to me that this cannot be the case of a weighted average very heavily weighted to the immediate past. > The historical positions of all the molecules in some water aren't sufficient to determine its present state. It's state depends on its container (ie., the pressure & temp of its environment). AFAIK, given that you could determine the momenta of the molecules from a history of their positions, this would be sufficient to determine its state (maybe you need their angular momenta independently?) The relevant information about the container has been impressed on the motion of the molecules. Similarly, we can suppose that the history of your environment becomes manifest in your mental states (and a predisposition towards certain state transitions) - though, on account of the complexity of that environment, in a compressed form. > We are more like water than a computer. A computer is a deterministic machine which is a deterministic function of its deterministic inputs. Water is a chatoic system whose state "isnt up to it". Water's state is /in/ its container, and water itself is a non-determinsitic chatoic soup. And yet we can usefully model fluid dynamics on a computer, even though the mathematical representation of the problem is analytically intractable. This line of argument does not appear to be leading in the direction you think it does. > We don't have "neural networks", we have cells. That some form "networks" has nothing to do with what we are. A complete misdirection. I am generally distrustful of these ontological arguments - quite often, it seems, things that were once thought of as being completely different turned out to be similar in some relevant way.