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The fundamental technical problem I see with PoW is that it only seldomly really aligns with the "good guy/bad guy" boundary. I.e. the basic purpose of PoW is
by xg15 5y ago
The fundamental technical problem I see with PoW is that it only seldomly really aligns with the "good guy/bad guy" boundary.
I.e. the basic purpose of PoW is security: Allow desirable actors in, keep malicious actors out. But this implies that "ability to put in more work" is actually a working way to distinguish good actors from bad actors. This is true in very specific cases, like blockchains - but I believe in most cases, this is actually not given, such as emails.
E.g., suppose we're using PoW to secure email: We do away with SPIF and all that and simply require each email to contain some hash that a sender had to bruteforce (just an example: use whatever PoW scheme you want).
If the scheme has a fixed difficulty, spammers can easily defeat it - they just have to rent (or capture) more machines. So you have to dynamically adjust the difficulty to meet some message/time unit quota. Congrats, suddenly the whole network is limitited to some maximum throughput. Alternatively, you can have separate difficulties for each user - but then, you need a way to track individual users, compute individual difficulties, etc. All of this needs some centralized entity again and agents that enforce the rules. If you have all that, why not use traditional rate limit and forgo the energy (or resource) waste?