4 ms·
Its not like anyone has ever really come up with a good solution to key distribution. You either trust a central authority (pki), deal with the mess that is web
by bawolff 5y ago
Its not like anyone has ever really come up with a good solution to key distribution. You either trust a central authority (pki), deal with the mess that is web of trust, or blindly trust your first connection and verify the person hasn't changed (tofu).
Honestly it kind of reminds me of the problem of defining "Truth" (in a philosophical sense)
All options are sucky in their own way.
- Seirdy 5y agoI'd say that DNSSEC records coupled with something resembling WKD makes for a pretty good way to distribute information in a somewhat trusted manner. Nothing can really replace out-of-band in-person verification because human perception is remarkably difficult to spoof against or MITM. Comparing keys found in two bands, e.g. DNSSEC records and WKD (using TLS verified by the wpki system), is close enough for most threat models: you'd have to compromise DNSSEC and a CA to break that system.
- bawolff 5y agoYou're still just replacing one central authority with a different one [or i guess 2] (i assume WKD = web key directory, in this context). With the email domain owner (i assume different from the recipent) being a cenral trust point (and if you totally trust them, why not just use mta-sts?). Now sure, depending on your needs, you might be able to get mild improvements by chosing a different set of trusted parties than the webpki's CAs, but i'm not sure its really that different at the end of the day.
- Seirdy 5y agoDANE + DNSSEC is much, much stronger than our CA system; if you control the keys (let alone if you go all the way and self host your DNS and mail servers), then you cut out pretty much all the intermediaries you reasonably can. You still have to trust DNS at the end of the day. MTA-STS depends on webpki and the CA system. Since not everything leverages DNSSEC yet and it's tricky to implement I'd supplement records with something resembling WKD so you have two bands. Another possibility is having clients fetch keys over both clearnet and an overlay network (e.g. Tor); this doesn't help if the web server is being MitM'd but at least you have to trust client endpoints a bit less.
- tptacek 5y agoThe opposite thing is true. DANE is far weaker than the CA system; it is centralized and controlled by parties that aren't accountable for security (and, more importantly, haven't spent the last decade with Mozilla and Google's gun aimed at their head over security issues). DNSSEC's centralized governance can get away with that, because they are de jure owners of the DNS hierarchy, and nobody can make them accountable for anything. You can't revoke .COM. But Google and Mozilla revoked all of Verisign. I trust Google and Mozilla more than I trust the world governments that control the DNS hierarchy, and I see the actual transparency mechanisms, like CT, that the WebPKI watchdogs have built; unlike with DNSSEC, they aren't simply a theoretical thing that could be built in the future, but rather operate today and have been responsible for numerous detections of misissuance.
- teddyh 5y agoAnd 20 minutes into the future, when Google is the undisputed monopolist of web browsers? Do you trust Google to be our unimpeachable lord and master?
- tptacek 5y agoDo I trust an undisputed monopolist Google to run Internet public key infrastructure more than I trust the United States Government? Yes, I don't even have to think hard on that.
- xorcist 5y agoGovernments do not control DNS in any practical sense. Even if, in theory, the US Department of Commerce could revoke SIDN control over .nl, it would be totally impractical for any directed attack. Control of Chrome or Google itself is a radically different matter. And with the CA system, there are a 140 other trust points to be attacked. What is weaker will depend on your perspective and threat model, but if the measure is how easy it would be for the government to create an arbitrary fraudulent SSL certificate, it is objectively much easier than creating an arbitrary fraudulent DNSSEC record.
- Spooky23 5y agoI think there is some promising work around using blockchains for this purpose.
- Anunayj 5y agoI really liked how keybase [1] approached this issue, their methodology involves generating keys on the client and making it post "proofs" on whatever social media(s) you use. This gives a my identity -> My key relation, and their client (which is open sourced) would verify these proofs clientside. So it's a server aided but still trustless. Unfortunately the development seems to have ceased after zoom acquired them. [1] https://keybase.io/ https://keybase.io/