Okay, my remarks on the product (the e2e encrypted backups): > Weak 512 bits RSA key signing key That's unprofessional at best, negligent at worse. I understa

Okay, my remarks on the product (the e2e encrypted backups): > Weak 512 bits RSA key signing key That's unprofessional at best, negligent at worse. I understand that it's quite a bit more calculations at more key lengths, but still, 512 is simply looking for trouble. > It enforces a maximum number of user login attempts, in order to prevent brute-force of a user PIN/passphrase; after ten unsuccessful attempts to log into an account, the account is locked and the backup data is irremediably lost. That's essentially a denial of service waiting to happen. So if another actor can access my account (e.g. has access to the telephone operator), they can destroy my backup. I would understand a delay between retries (maybe a week ?), but just throwing out the backup is just bad.