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The article and kristjansson's post are about intentional false negatives. My comment was pointing out that the well known fact that the neuralhash is highly v
by nullc 5y ago
The article and kristjansson's post are about intentional false negatives.
My comment was pointing out that the well known fact that the neuralhash is highly vulnerable to preimage attacks (intentional false positives) also means that is is highly vulnerable to intentional false negatives. Changing the 96-bit hash to a specific value while minimizing the visible image change is a LOT harder than just changing any single bit, but the harder task has been amply demonstrated.
Neuralhash is one component, yes, but it is a limiting component. If a slightly tweaked image has a different NeuralHash it will never be detected by their scheme.
- simondotau 5y agoI don't think Apple is concerned about the <0.1% of CSAM aficionados who read about Apple's plans to scan for CSAM and thinks "hey, let me blindly trust some tool I found on the internet to slightly mangle my highly illegal images so that I can continue co-mingling them with personal photos in iCloud, accessible to anyone who picks up my phone while unlocked. Or any other device synchronised to the same iCloud account." The App Store is presumably full of easy to use apps which can store photo galleries in a separately encrypted vault. This is where people will go after being shooed away from iCloud, not image manglers.