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My knowledge is as a foreigner, but I was under the impression that the Greens and FDP have both been prospective kingmakers in the last several federal electio

by ethbr0 5y ago

My knowledge is as a foreigner, but I was under the impression that the Greens and FDP have both been prospective kingmakers in the last several federal elections, given the math and split between the CDU/CSU and SPD? And I'd assume that as the center, courting interests important to their voters is of outsized importance to the larger parties, in an attempt to peel off votes? But maybe I'm poorly informed?

formerly_proven 5y ago
I see how you can get that impression from the outside. But for the first three Merkel administrations the CDU/CSU very firmly ruled out any coalition with the Greens, which were somewhat left-ish at the time. In that timeframe they undid most of the energy policies ("Ausstieg aus dem Atomausstieg") enacted by the SPD-Greens coalition of 1998-2005, and then later reversed parts of that because public support for nuclear energy collapsed even in the center-right part (CDU, CSU, FDP) of the political spectrum in 2011 due to Fukushima. Some call it "Ausstieg aus dem Ausstieg aus dem Atomausstieg". It's far more expensive than the original nuclear exit plan - pretty much a golden parachute for nuclear plant operators, and also caused a significant ramp-up in coal. You're right though that before the final Merkel administration the Greens, the CDU/CSU and the FDP had talks, which ultimately failed because the FDP passed the CSU (the right-wing regional appendix to the CDU) on the right, which was a bit too much for the Greens, which at the time largely occupied the same center-ish position they hold today, having shifted right considerably in the time between 2005 and 2017. Overall the impact of the Greens party has been very small on the Merkel administrations, however, some parts of the green movement (which is not closely tied to the Greens party) in Germany are the majority opinion in Germany (especially when it comes to a heavy anti nuclear stance) and that's sufficient to drive Merkel policy making. It's also important to note here that Germany has a very strong NIMBY attitude, so while the majority "wants" green energy, they don't want any of the infrastructure in sight. I'd also like to point out a fundamental difference between Bundestag culture and US Capitol culture. There are bi-partisan bills in the Capitol, but in the Bundestag it is customary for the ruling parties to unconditionally veto drafts introduced by other parties - exceptions are rare. Almost all votes in the Bundestag are under Fraktionszwang i.e. MPs deviating from the party line won't get on the election list next time around, so don't have a safe seat any more (because parties in Germany can't literally force their MPs to vote their way, they can only "incentivize" it).
- ethbr0 5y ago
  Thanks for taking the time to write this out! Politics is so intricate that there's always more nuance than one can get from international news. And yet, despite all the variations, most people seem to accept that their country's version of democracy is the only possible option. To me, it seems natural to be fascinated by its different shapes in different places. E.g. Fraktionszwang, which is an entirely different approach than the US-style whipping (i.e. encouraging allegiance, but at most only threatening to support a primary challenger from the same party, and typically accomplished more through favor-trading). I'm in the middle of Dark on Netflix, and even as a single perspective it's felt enlightening in how it poses the German everyman in relation to the nuclear energy industry. In a way that feels very different to even US perspectives (my country). In your opinion, would it be fair to say that Chernobyl and then the Cold War drumbeat of nuclear weapons use were the main historical anti-nuclear motivators? And then Fukushima stirred up that present-but-latent thinking in the modern zeitgeist? I guess the nuance I'm most interested but confused about is how Fukushima triggered such an apparent breakdown in nuclear support in the center-right, and so quickly? Was there pre-existing anti-nuclear sentiment there too? Or was it more about pro-coal sentiment? Or something else entirely?
  - formerly_proven 5y ago
    Yes, opposition of nuclear energy in Germany is historically tied to the peace movement and opposition to foreign powers deploying their nukes on their bases in Germany. Chernobyl was definitely another catalyst here. Though no new nuclear construction has taken place since the early 80s already. Fukushima likely felt very relevant again, because Japan is seen as a highly advanced country and the Japanese are considered extremely diligent in Germany. Parts of the Fukushima plant were also pretty much the same age as many operational German plants at the time, and their reactors are a Western design so the "Soviets don't know squat how to build a safe reactor" excuse that comes up with Chernobyl doesn't have any traction. Overall the nuclear situation in Japan was seen as generally analogous to the nuclear situation in Germany: "The Japanese just had an accident, and we're like them and don't want an accident, so let's shut the reactors down." Politically, things have become far more convoluted in recent years with large parts of the green spectrum becoming more and more critical of "radiation" in particular (cellular networks, wifi, microwaves, anything nuclear) and entire branches of science in general (nuclear research, obviously, but also pharmaceutics, medicine, biology and others). As far as the Green party is concerned, historically it had two wings ("fundis" and "realos", the former being the fundamentalists, the latter being realpolitikers), which in principle would both count as sort of left, but in practice the fundis stayed more or less left-ish, while the realos migrated to the right. The SPD-Greens coalition was enabled by the realos wing. Similarly, the realos are now the de-facto ruling wing inside the party since 2018, which is why a SPD-Greens-FDP coalition is possible in the first place. Coal is quite a difficult topic. Most coal is strip-mined in Germany, which causes the expropriation of entire villages and small cities. That's not a talking point in politics. A state PM illegally dissolving protests against strip mining isn't even a scandal. However, if for example The Left publicly ponders whether expropriation of apartment houses and conversion to social housing in cities could be one way to solve the housing crisis, that's a major scandal and causes them to not pass the 5 % threshold. That might give you a feel for the standing of coal. Despite only employing around 20-25k people in Germany, maintaining coal jobs has become basically an iron curtain protecting coal. To circle back to the Green party, it's noteworthy that their party program is not even close to a program in line with the 1.5 °C target.

by ethbr0 5y ago

formerly_proven 5y ago

I see how you can get that impression from the outside. But for the first three Merkel administrations the CDU/CSU very firmly ruled out any coalition with the Greens, which were somewhat left-ish at the time. In that timeframe they undid most of the energy policies ("Ausstieg aus dem Atomausstieg") enacted by the SPD-Greens coalition of 1998-2005, and then later reversed parts of that because public support for nuclear energy collapsed even in the center-right part (CDU, CSU, FDP) of the political spectrum in 2011 due to Fukushima. Some call it "Ausstieg aus dem Ausstieg aus dem Atomausstieg". It's far more expensive than the original nuclear exit plan - pretty much a golden parachute for nuclear plant operators, and also caused a significant ramp-up in coal. You're right though that before the final Merkel administration the Greens, the CDU/CSU and the FDP had talks, which ultimately failed because the FDP passed the CSU (the right-wing regional appendix to the CDU) on the right, which was a bit too much for the Greens, which at the time largely occupied the same center-ish position they hold today, having shifted right considerably in the time between 2005 and 2017. Overall the impact of the Greens party has been very small on the Merkel administrations, however, some parts of the green movement (which is not closely tied to the Greens party) in Germany are the majority opinion in Germany (especially when it comes to a heavy anti nuclear stance) and that's sufficient to drive Merkel policy making. It's also important to note here that Germany has a very strong NIMBY attitude, so while the majority "wants" green energy, they don't want any of the infrastructure in sight. I'd also like to point out a fundamental difference between Bundestag culture and US Capitol culture. There are bi-partisan bills in the Capitol, but in the Bundestag it is customary for the ruling parties to unconditionally veto drafts introduced by other parties - exceptions are rare. Almost all votes in the Bundestag are under Fraktionszwang i.e. MPs deviating from the party line won't get on the election list next time around, so don't have a safe seat any more (because parties in Germany can't literally force their MPs to vote their way, they can only "incentivize" it).

ethbr0 5y ago
Thanks for taking the time to write this out! Politics is so intricate that there's always more nuance than one can get from international news. And yet, despite all the variations, most people seem to accept that their country's version of democracy is the only possible option. To me, it seems natural to be fascinated by its different shapes in different places. E.g. Fraktionszwang, which is an entirely different approach than the US-style whipping (i.e. encouraging allegiance, but at most only threatening to support a primary challenger from the same party, and typically accomplished more through favor-trading). I'm in the middle of Dark on Netflix, and even as a single perspective it's felt enlightening in how it poses the German everyman in relation to the nuclear energy industry. In a way that feels very different to even US perspectives (my country). In your opinion, would it be fair to say that Chernobyl and then the Cold War drumbeat of nuclear weapons use were the main historical anti-nuclear motivators? And then Fukushima stirred up that present-but-latent thinking in the modern zeitgeist? I guess the nuance I'm most interested but confused about is how Fukushima triggered such an apparent breakdown in nuclear support in the center-right, and so quickly? Was there pre-existing anti-nuclear sentiment there too? Or was it more about pro-coal sentiment? Or something else entirely?
- formerly_proven 5y ago
  Yes, opposition of nuclear energy in Germany is historically tied to the peace movement and opposition to foreign powers deploying their nukes on their bases in Germany. Chernobyl was definitely another catalyst here. Though no new nuclear construction has taken place since the early 80s already. Fukushima likely felt very relevant again, because Japan is seen as a highly advanced country and the Japanese are considered extremely diligent in Germany. Parts of the Fukushima plant were also pretty much the same age as many operational German plants at the time, and their reactors are a Western design so the "Soviets don't know squat how to build a safe reactor" excuse that comes up with Chernobyl doesn't have any traction. Overall the nuclear situation in Japan was seen as generally analogous to the nuclear situation in Germany: "The Japanese just had an accident, and we're like them and don't want an accident, so let's shut the reactors down." Politically, things have become far more convoluted in recent years with large parts of the green spectrum becoming more and more critical of "radiation" in particular (cellular networks, wifi, microwaves, anything nuclear) and entire branches of science in general (nuclear research, obviously, but also pharmaceutics, medicine, biology and others). As far as the Green party is concerned, historically it had two wings ("fundis" and "realos", the former being the fundamentalists, the latter being realpolitikers), which in principle would both count as sort of left, but in practice the fundis stayed more or less left-ish, while the realos migrated to the right. The SPD-Greens coalition was enabled by the realos wing. Similarly, the realos are now the de-facto ruling wing inside the party since 2018, which is why a SPD-Greens-FDP coalition is possible in the first place. Coal is quite a difficult topic. Most coal is strip-mined in Germany, which causes the expropriation of entire villages and small cities. That's not a talking point in politics. A state PM illegally dissolving protests against strip mining isn't even a scandal. However, if for example The Left publicly ponders whether expropriation of apartment houses and conversion to social housing in cities could be one way to solve the housing crisis, that's a major scandal and causes them to not pass the 5 % threshold. That might give you a feel for the standing of coal. Despite only employing around 20-25k people in Germany, maintaining coal jobs has become basically an iron curtain protecting coal. To circle back to the Green party, it's noteworthy that their party program is not even close to a program in line with the 1.5 °C target.