5 ms·

i still don't understand how they can route messages to devices without having some kind of registry as well as leaking the destination out of the encrypted pay

by bsaul 5y ago

i still don't understand how they can route messages to devices without having some kind of registry as well as leaking the destination out of the encrypted payload.. edit : root -> route :)) talk about a freudian slip :)))

Arnt 5y ago
The verb is route. Rooting a phone... you made me sit up there ;) They do have a registry, but it's not relevant to this order. When you send me a message, your phone sends Signal my phone number and an encrypted blob. Signal routes that to my phone and the server doesn't keep a long-term record of that. Thus, Signal-the-server has a record for the next many seconds at least containing the destination of a messsage. It does not have my profile name, your profile name or any way to connect your phone number to that message. Signal running on my phone has enough state concerning you to decrypt the encrypted blob and see that it's from you. Signal, the organisation, is in control of all the source code and could change the code to gain control of all the information Luxembourg is asking for. But the past is immutable. Noone can go back in time and retroactively store more data. Signal didn't log the destination phone number at the time and so it's not available now, Signal didn't transmit the profile names to the server and so it never arrived and could not be stored.
- bsaul 5y ago
  then they'll probably be compelled to keep the history in some stash. iirc , internet providers had to face exactly this requirements in the 90s.
  - Arnt 5y ago
    Nah, the treaty of Westphalia holds. Countries are sovereign in their territory and basically powerless outside it. Luxembourg doesn't compel foreign foundations in foreign jurisdictions. Luxembourg has the legal right to forbid people in its territory from using apps like Signal, though. But I doubt it would even try to that, because it's really difficult to write a scope that includes things like Signal messages and yet excludes things like messages that instruct and authorise your bank to transfer money.
    - newaccount2021 5y ago
      extradition treaties, international law enforcement treaties etc all undermine your premise
XorNot 5y ago
Signal can just elect not to store that data, because they don't care. Realistically it might be possible to compel them to retain a log which phone numbers communicated with a specific device, but as I understand it after the initial handshake to register your phone number they also don't retain what it actually is - just the hash of it. So it would have to be a demand for forcible cooperation going forwards, since you can't recover data you don't have. You're never going to make abstract metadata like volume of messages and relationships completely anonymous, but that's essentially an opsec issue which Signal is trying to solve by normalizing it anyway: if all your communications are always encrypted all the time, and you constantly use them, then there's no discontinuity if you go from "I don't like advertisers" too "I am in possession of the panama papers" - it all looks the same.
- tialaramex 5y ago
  > You're never going to make abstract metadata like volume of messages and relationships completely anonymous Even here Signal works very hard. Signal doesn't know group memberships, all the group metadata is encrypted and acted on based on cryptography, so somebody who is apparently authorised to administrate a group kicked somebody out of it, and then they sent a message to the group. Who was that admin? What's the group's name? Who is in it? Who did they kick out? What was the message? All deliberately unknown to Signal. Also all messages to people who agree to accept your messages in advance (so, most people's friends, and those whistleblower hotline type setups at newspapers) are anonymous to Signal. You've got proof you're authorised to send this message, so they don't need to care who you are and they don't ask your client who it is. They need to know who the message is for to deliver it, but that's all.

by bsaul 5y ago

Arnt 5y ago

The verb is route. Rooting a phone... you made me sit up there ;) They do have a registry, but it's not relevant to this order. When you send me a message, your phone sends Signal my phone number and an encrypted blob. Signal routes that to my phone and the server doesn't keep a long-term record of that. Thus, Signal-the-server has a record for the next many seconds at least containing the destination of a messsage. It does not have my profile name, your profile name or any way to connect your phone number to that message. Signal running on my phone has enough state concerning you to decrypt the encrypted blob and see that it's from you. Signal, the organisation, is in control of all the source code and could change the code to gain control of all the information Luxembourg is asking for. But the past is immutable. Noone can go back in time and retroactively store more data. Signal didn't log the destination phone number at the time and so it's not available now, Signal didn't transmit the profile names to the server and so it never arrived and could not be stored.

bsaul 5y ago
then they'll probably be compelled to keep the history in some stash. iirc , internet providers had to face exactly this requirements in the 90s.
- Arnt 5y ago
  Nah, the treaty of Westphalia holds. Countries are sovereign in their territory and basically powerless outside it. Luxembourg doesn't compel foreign foundations in foreign jurisdictions. Luxembourg has the legal right to forbid people in its territory from using apps like Signal, though. But I doubt it would even try to that, because it's really difficult to write a scope that includes things like Signal messages and yet excludes things like messages that instruct and authorise your bank to transfer money.
  - newaccount2021 5y ago
    extradition treaties, international law enforcement treaties etc all undermine your premise

XorNot 5y ago

Signal can just elect not to store that data, because they don't care. Realistically it might be possible to compel them to retain a log which phone numbers communicated with a specific device, but as I understand it after the initial handshake to register your phone number they also don't retain what it actually is - just the hash of it. So it would have to be a demand for forcible cooperation going forwards, since you can't recover data you don't have. You're never going to make abstract metadata like volume of messages and relationships completely anonymous, but that's essentially an opsec issue which Signal is trying to solve by normalizing it anyway: if all your communications are always encrypted all the time, and you constantly use them, then there's no discontinuity if you go from "I don't like advertisers" too "I am in possession of the panama papers" - it all looks the same.

tialaramex 5y ago
> You're never going to make abstract metadata like volume of messages and relationships completely anonymous Even here Signal works very hard. Signal doesn't know group memberships, all the group metadata is encrypted and acted on based on cryptography, so somebody who is apparently authorised to administrate a group kicked somebody out of it, and then they sent a message to the group. Who was that admin? What's the group's name? Who is in it? Who did they kick out? What was the message? All deliberately unknown to Signal. Also all messages to people who agree to accept your messages in advance (so, most people's friends, and those whistleblower hotline type setups at newspapers) are anonymous to Signal. You've got proof you're authorised to send this message, so they don't need to care who you are and they don't ask your client who it is. They need to know who the message is for to deliver it, but that's all.