3 ms·
The key fundamental weakness (the susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks) was addressed in the original BB84 publication [1]: The need for the public (non
by fsh 5y ago
The key fundamental weakness (the susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks) was addressed in the original BB84 publication [1]:
The need for the public (non-quantum) channel in this scheme to be immune to active eavesdropping can be relaxed if the Alex and Bob have agreed beforehand on a small secret key, which they use to create Wegman-Carter multiple-message authentication tags for their messages over the public channel.
Of course immediately raises the question why one should use QKD at all. If a shared secret is required anyway, why not simply use symmetric cryptography?
In many modern articles, QKD is presented as a replacement for asymmetric cryptography. This I think is very misleading, since the reason for using asymmetric cryptography is that one does not need a shared secret.
[1] http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/files/us-bennetc/BB84highest.pdf http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/files/us-bennetc...
- omegalulw 5y ago> Of course immediately raises the question why one should use QKD at all +1. Last I recall, AES is for the most part extremely resilient to attacks by quantum computers. It's RSA that drops dead.