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The point I was trying to make was that this does not, in fact, prevent hacking. It merely presents an inconvenience - as evidenced by the amateur repair techni
by aenis 5y ago
The point I was trying to make was that this does not, in fact, prevent hacking. It merely presents an inconvenience - as evidenced by the amateur repair technicians being able to defeat it. Apple surely expected that to be possible.
Inconvenience to many means fewer repair shops. That, too, they have likely anticipated.
Relying on this "feature" to trust your device not having been physically tampered with would be poor judgement.
- dpkonofa 5y agoExcept it does. The only thing the “amateur repair technicians” have succeeded in doing is reactivated an existing FaceID sensor. That doesn’t mean they’ve bypassed it so, yes, it does prevent hacking.
- aenis 5y agoI think the idea was to prevent the attacker from being able to replace the screen without the owner noticing. Replacing the screen may allow the attacker to place own custom hw in the device without the owner noticing (screen is large, has good exposure to audio and video, etc.). For the FaceID to be secure - which I believe it is, within reason - the chip needs to be able to establish trust with the other components of the chain. It's not achieved with thin solder and glue, but with cryptography. I don't think what gluing it to the screen achieves in terms of security, it's not like you can replace the faceid sensor with a different one anyway.
- dpkonofa 5y agoBut that's the whole point. The display and the FaceID sensor are cryptographically signed. That's the entire complaint now. Before, it was the FaceID assembly that was part of the display assembly. Now they're separated but instead of just the FaceID sensor being serialized, they both are.