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You're literally responding to an article that shows that the situation you're describing would be impossible with this device. How does this have nothing to do

You're literally responding to an article that shows that the situation you're describing would be impossible with this device. How does this have nothing to do with security?

smoldesu 5y ago
> The most sophisticated repair shops have found a workaround, but it’s not a quick, clever hack—it’s physically moving a soldered chip from the original screen onto the replacement. Sounds like that's not a problem for sophisticated adversaries, such as, say, the United States Government.
- kemayo 5y ago
  But presumably the attack wouldn't be replacing the screen -- which is what this workaround allows -- it'd be replacing the chip with one that you've compromised, because then you could have it let you bypass security. Not to say that they won't find a way to get around that, just that the existing workaround doesn't create a security issue.
- dpkonofa 5y ago
  Physically moving the soldered chip from the original to the replacement doesn't disable FaceID, though. It just allows you to continue using FaceID. That means you still need the person whose phone it is to unlock it or the passcode used to bypass FaceID.
  - hda2 5y ago
    If it isn't capable of preventing screen replacements, what security benefits did Apple apple want to achieve with this misfeature? Securing analogue components via serialization is mostly a pipe-dream and apple knows it. This is just another power grab disguised as a security feature.
    - dpkonofa 5y ago
      It’s not meant to prevent screen replacements, that’s the whole point. It’s meant to verify the chain of trust of the hardware involved in the security function of the device. If you move that from one device to another, you haven’t broken the chain.
rasz 5y ago
You mean article with this text: >One experienced repair shop told me they’ve been swapping screen chips since the iPhone X to avoid touch calibration issues and “genuine” part warnings; they’ve got the process down to about 15 minutes. 15 minutes is "impossible with this device"? > How does this have nothing to do with security? because FaceID hardware is NOT on the screen assembly, and the only part generating the warning is the hardware DRM ID chip.
- dpkonofa 5y ago
  You’re acting like they’re bypassing FaceID. They are not. They’re just moving an existing chain of trust to a new device.
aenis 5y ago
The point I was trying to make was that this does not, in fact, prevent hacking. It merely presents an inconvenience - as evidenced by the amateur repair technicians being able to defeat it. Apple surely expected that to be possible. Inconvenience to many means fewer repair shops. That, too, they have likely anticipated. Relying on this "feature" to trust your device not having been physically tampered with would be poor judgement.
- dpkonofa 5y ago
  Except it does. The only thing the “amateur repair technicians” have succeeded in doing is reactivated an existing FaceID sensor. That doesn’t mean they’ve bypassed it so, yes, it does prevent hacking.
  - aenis 5y ago
    I think the idea was to prevent the attacker from being able to replace the screen without the owner noticing. Replacing the screen may allow the attacker to place own custom hw in the device without the owner noticing (screen is large, has good exposure to audio and video, etc.). For the FaceID to be secure - which I believe it is, within reason - the chip needs to be able to establish trust with the other components of the chain. It's not achieved with thin solder and glue, but with cryptography. I don't think what gluing it to the screen achieves in terms of security, it's not like you can replace the faceid sensor with a different one anyway.
    - dpkonofa 5y ago
      But that's the whole point. The display and the FaceID sensor are cryptographically signed. That's the entire complaint now. Before, it was the FaceID assembly that was part of the display assembly. Now they're separated but instead of just the FaceID sensor being serialized, they both are.

You're literally responding to an article that shows that the situation you're describing would be impossible with this device. How does this have nothing to do with security?

smoldesu 5y ago

> The most sophisticated repair shops have found a workaround, but it’s not a quick, clever hack—it’s physically moving a soldered chip from the original screen onto the replacement. Sounds like that's not a problem for sophisticated adversaries, such as, say, the United States Government.

kemayo 5y ago
But presumably the attack wouldn't be replacing the screen -- which is what this workaround allows -- it'd be replacing the chip with one that you've compromised, because then you could have it let you bypass security. Not to say that they won't find a way to get around that, just that the existing workaround doesn't create a security issue.
dpkonofa 5y ago
Physically moving the soldered chip from the original to the replacement doesn't disable FaceID, though. It just allows you to continue using FaceID. That means you still need the person whose phone it is to unlock it or the passcode used to bypass FaceID.
- hda2 5y ago
  If it isn't capable of preventing screen replacements, what security benefits did Apple apple want to achieve with this misfeature? Securing analogue components via serialization is mostly a pipe-dream and apple knows it. This is just another power grab disguised as a security feature.
  - dpkonofa 5y ago
    It’s not meant to prevent screen replacements, that’s the whole point. It’s meant to verify the chain of trust of the hardware involved in the security function of the device. If you move that from one device to another, you haven’t broken the chain.

rasz 5y ago

You mean article with this text: >One experienced repair shop told me they’ve been swapping screen chips since the iPhone X to avoid touch calibration issues and “genuine” part warnings; they’ve got the process down to about 15 minutes. 15 minutes is "impossible with this device"? > How does this have nothing to do with security? because FaceID hardware is NOT on the screen assembly, and the only part generating the warning is the hardware DRM ID chip.

dpkonofa 5y ago
You’re acting like they’re bypassing FaceID. They are not. They’re just moving an existing chain of trust to a new device.

aenis 5y ago

The point I was trying to make was that this does not, in fact, prevent hacking. It merely presents an inconvenience - as evidenced by the amateur repair technicians being able to defeat it. Apple surely expected that to be possible. Inconvenience to many means fewer repair shops. That, too, they have likely anticipated. Relying on this "feature" to trust your device not having been physically tampered with would be poor judgement.

dpkonofa 5y ago
Except it does. The only thing the “amateur repair technicians” have succeeded in doing is reactivated an existing FaceID sensor. That doesn’t mean they’ve bypassed it so, yes, it does prevent hacking.
- aenis 5y ago
  I think the idea was to prevent the attacker from being able to replace the screen without the owner noticing. Replacing the screen may allow the attacker to place own custom hw in the device without the owner noticing (screen is large, has good exposure to audio and video, etc.). For the FaceID to be secure - which I believe it is, within reason - the chip needs to be able to establish trust with the other components of the chain. It's not achieved with thin solder and glue, but with cryptography. I don't think what gluing it to the screen achieves in terms of security, it's not like you can replace the faceid sensor with a different one anyway.
  - dpkonofa 5y ago
    But that's the whole point. The display and the FaceID sensor are cryptographically signed. That's the entire complaint now. Before, it was the FaceID assembly that was part of the display assembly. Now they're separated but instead of just the FaceID sensor being serialized, they both are.