This analogy is somewhat valid, since facial and DNA data are mostly "public," given how often we show our face or incidentally shed some DNA (IIRC the police c

This analogy is somewhat valid, since facial and DNA data are mostly "public," given how often we show our face or incidentally shed some DNA (IIRC the police collected the golden state killer's DNA from a cup at a restaurant). But it also relies on a shallow comparison – unlike a facial scan, DNA is not a passively collectible identifier. Collecting and processing DNA requires active, physical surveillance that downloading and faceprinting a photograph does not. This physical limitation eliminates most practical risk of a global adversary exploiting DNA matching to build a dragnet surveillance regime. Meanwhile, facial recognition has already wrought such a state of affairs. Incidentally, passive DNA surveillance does happen, but only in aggregate, like when sampling wastewater for toxins or other biomarkers. I'm not aware of any technology that separates the distinct DNA of individuals from mixed wastewater. If that were possible, then maybe DNA dragnet surveillance would be, too.