3 ms·
The silver non-radioactive lining here is that there does appear to be some institutional accountability - at least on the front line. Would be great if that ac
by pseudolus 5y ago
The silver non-radioactive lining here is that there does appear to be some institutional accountability - at least on the front line. Would be great if that accountability bled into the civilian world.
- gostsamo 5y agoDepends. Sometimes the only people who get fired are those who can't defend themselves while the hire command does not investigate the reasons for the failures beyond the more immediate ones.
- sswaner 5y agoI believe that is true in this case. The 7th Fleet has incurred a series of accidents in recent years. Lack of training, overworked staff, and delayed maintenance may have been contributing factors beyond the control of those punished.
- xwdv 5y agoHeh, you think this is about accountability? This was like a politically motivated move by someone who saw an opportunity to remove a senior officer they didn’t like.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- atonse 5y agoDo you actually have information implying such or is it mainly cynicism? Because I wondered the same but I know at least my thoughts are not based on any intuition or knowledge of how the Navy operates, whatsoever.
- moron4hire 5y agoCut out some high ranking field officers, don't have to pay out their pensions, and make room for lower ranking officers to move up without risking new blood entering the admiralty that might question why everyone is running short staffed and not training enough? Sounds like a huge win.
- QuarterReptile 5y ago>don't have to pay out their pensions Doubtful: this CO will be swapped out, first likely by his boss, then by someone else in the CO pipeline. This CO will go to a shore-based job and will undoubtedly keep his pension. You could argue that this relieved CO is the one getting a good deal, but that is to deny the significance of professional pride (the significance of which is supported by the rarity of these events.) The rest of this comment feels like speculation by someone with no insight into the process for billeting major submarine commands.
- nabla9 5y agoResponsibility for outcome is old naval tradition, both merchant navy and military. Captain is responsible for everything that happens. Even for some things outside their control. Responsibility for outcome is different from responsibility derived from intent and capability. South China Sea is hard to navigate. It's not completely mapped, seafloor mapping must be even less complete. When submarine travels using only passive sonars it's effectively blind. The collision could be due to error or just captain taking risk to fulfill the mission. There is always some regulation that they break.
- lmilcin 5y agoYes, that is exactly right. I am skipper on a small yacht, not a captain of a nuclear sub, but the reality is basically the same. In the end it is my job to make sure we don't do something that might endanger the ship and the crew. And it is my job to make sure the boat is safe for travel. And while underway I have sole discretion to make any decisions including heading back to nearest port or calling for help if I don't feel safe to continue and I am responsible for whatever happens even if I delegate the task to the crew. It is my responsibility to make sure the crew is trained and able to execute the task safely. Not sure if I hit rocks at night? Nobody cares. It is my responsibility to judge if I have enough skill and if the boat is equipped well enough to navigate in present conditions. I understand navy captains are trained differently, and navy has concept of an acceptable risk (and captains and admirals have been fired from the job for not taking enough risk). But there is a difference between acceptable risk that is taken for some much higher payoff in a military action and an unnecessary risk that is taken without any particular need or payoff or that could have been easily prevented or mitigated.
- potiuper 5y agoThe questions that will likely never be answered is was it really necessary to navigate in uncharted waters? Why is the Navy not putting more effort into charting in times of peace rather than taking these risks of navigating basically blind?
- 5y ago
- indymike 5y agoWhen I got out of the Navy, it took a decade to adjust to two things: incompetence and intentionally bad decisions by managers. Incompetence was rare. Everyone was very well trained and well organized. You literally had to prove you knew how to do a job before you were allowed to do it. Decisions were always taken seriously, and mistakes were pretty rare and when they happened, there were consequences for the people that made the bad decision, and that included senior officers. A willfully bad decision would land you out of the Navy at best, and in prison at worst, so most people cared about their work, especially the management level, to a level I do not see in the civilian world. The result: we trusted our managers, and they trusted the workers.
- skywal_l 5y agoReading Generation Kill by Evan Write does not give this impression of the US military...
- staticautomatic 5y agoHell, reading most things about the military doesn’t give this impression.
- ZeroGravitas 5y agoBit older but Catch-22 also paints a different picture.
- QuarterReptile 5y agoThis is much less applicable yet, given that the all-volunteer military, which has a higher degree of professionalism than its previous iteration as a result, didn't exist at the time.
- SamoyedFurFluff 5y agoGeneration Kill apparently covered a marine battalion (according to Wikipedia), not the navy. To my understanding the branches of the military function as independently cooperating entities rather than one large organization and therefore when criticizing systemic/institutional failures and cultures of the military, the specific branch in question is an important detail. Criticizing the navy using the marine corps in this instance is similar to criticizing the us coast guard for marine corps behavior.
- frankfrankfrank 5y agoI do not believe that this topic can be discussed with any degree of openness here, lest one run afoul of regime dogma, however, what is more important than remaining institutional accountability in the submarine services, is the trajectory/heading of that culture. To your point, the heading of the accountability culture is in fact bleeding into the civilian world, just likely not as you may want it to. The submarine services are a severely lagging, not leading indicator, the antipode of the canary. Expect more of these kinds of events, because the pillars that uphold and scales that measure health of any system can only be fudged and messed around with for so long before reality will no longer be refused its pound. The reason why the submarine services have been the one of the far outliers that cause them to be extreme lagging indicators, is that the consequences in both life, treasure, and consequences is so immense that there was always not only a zero failure policy, but a multiple redundancy zero failure policy. That is also why these sailors were held accountable, because as in all the other recent events, multiple redundant system nodes were undermined to produce the failures.
- bell-cot 5y agoThe prior NPR story on this said that the seamount (which they hit) was uncharted. And suggested that there are ~100,000 vaguely similar seamounts in the world's oceans. I suspect that the Navy would dump a cautious sub captain - who ran on the surface, or slowly, or using his sonar to (loudly) look for uncharted seamounts in his path in such circumstances - extremely fast. I would not call it institutional accountability when people are ordered to run through a minefield, and then the ones who get unlucky are punished.