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> An email provider would need a "to" code from you when you registered with them. Then with each request to download your mail, they send you a randomly genera
by bawolff 5y ago
> An email provider would need a "to" code from you when you registered with them. Then with each request to download your mail, they send you a randomly generated number encoded with your "to" code, and you respond by decoding it and sending the number back encrypted with another number they give you.
I agree you could do schemes like this (although some of the details here would need finessing), i just don't really think it fits the description of at a low enough protocol level its transparent. Like this is custom application logic - it doesn't get much higher level than that. How could an application forget its there if it has to keep track of storing numbers and finding/sending/decoding the right ones. If this generalized to something that fit every application, i'd say fair enough, but it seems incredibly specialized to the example at hand.
If all we're imagining is a standardized set of primitives, we already have that. AES, SHA-256, HMAC are all very well studied and well supported (the public key world doesn't quite have as much of a clear "winner", but there are still very standardized well studied options).
All of these things are very secure when used correctly. People however invariably use them incorrectly. Composing primitives (incorrectly) is one of the big ways people get into trouble with crypto.
I guess what you're suggesting is an opinionated library that has a bunch of safe options to make it less likely to shoot yourself in the foot? I mean, i certainly agree we could do better when it comes to usability of crypto libraries. Ultimately though, no library is going to prevent a programmer from (for example) giving the secret key to the attacker. By extension, we're never going to have a library that takes the thinking out of using crypto. A big portion of computer security problems are simply the programmer accidentally telling the computer to do something silly, and the computer blindly following orders. I don't think its possible to get rid of that if the programmer is the one calling the shots. Which is why i find the idea of automatic encryption on the tcp or ip layer so enticing - your average programmer would have no influence over it - but the idea also seems to have severe technical limitations (or at least it needs someone smarter than me to figure it out)