6 ms·

Oh I think it's an awesome project, too. It's just that it sort of makes concrete what were previously hypothetical arguments about simulating living beings. I

Oh I think it's an awesome project, too. It's just that it sort of makes concrete what were previously hypothetical arguments about simulating living beings. I can't bring myself to care much about a C. elegans, but let's say we scale this up enough to simulate something the size of a dog plus its environment. Presumably it has subjective experience, like a real dog? What are the ethics of writing code that would result in its "suffering"?

userbinator 5y ago
What are the ethics of writing code that would result in its "suffering"? Do you have the same concerns about other, perhaps much simpler but also virtual and pseudointelligent entities, such as computer-controlled players in games? It does raise some deeply philosophical questions about life and what it means in general.
- mshroyer 5y ago
  > computer-controlled players in games? Nah, I'm not particularly worried about that. Because those are all currently based on models too simple to conceivably have anything like consciousness. On the other hand, once we can simulate a human and its environment at OpenWorm's targeted level of abstraction, presumably we would have a conscious being there?
  - reuben364 5y ago
    The only consciousness we experience is our own. In the extreme, we can no more say a chair suffers than a human being other than ourselves. Of course we take the pragmatic approach of deciding things that look like suffering to us is suffering.
    - mshroyer 5y ago
      I strongly disagree. The human brain, in its connectome, encompasses enough computational complexity to contain consciousness and suffering. A chair does not, at least not based on any model I've yet seen proposed.
      - reuben364 5y ago
        And on what basis do you claim that computational complexity is a necessary condition for consciousness and suffering? There is only one datum you have for consciousness. Other people can tell you that they experience consciousness, but so can a Text-to-Speech program
        handol 5y ago
        Would you believe that a text-to-speech program was suffering if it told you so?
        reuben364 5y ago
        > Of course we take the pragmatic approach of deciding things that look like suffering to us is suffering. Hence why I said this. There is nothing you can use to believe a human's claims over the text-to-speech's claims, so we choose what looks like suffering to us. However, my point is that it is an arbitrary choice.
        pjerem 5y ago
        > There is nothing you can use to believe a human's claims over the text-to-speech's claims Of course there is. The human facing me looks similar to me so I can interpolate its claims with my own experience of being an human. I thinks it’s also for the same reason that we have variable degrees of empathy against animals : the more the animal looks like us (that can be size, number of members, physically, in terms of effective communication…), the more, on average, we have empathy for them. This can go to the extent that people commonly feel « something » about their cars and their human-face-like designs combined with their single ability to move.
        reuben364 5y ago
        Yes, but this is arbitrary. That is my point. There's no reason to believe that you can extrapolate your own subjective experience to others based on their similarity to you.
scollet 5y ago
Thanks for spurring this thread. This has been pretty great.
hutzlibu 5y ago
"What are the ethics of writing code that would result in its "suffering"? " I doubt that code can suffer. We do not understand feelings enough and this might help to understand it eventually - but for now I see no reason to assume that they can recreated digitally. And I am much more worried, about many real life beings that suffer in our food chain and co.
- mshroyer 5y ago
  Why would we assume subjective experience can't be recreated digitally? Inert "code" can't suffer, of course. But assuming we accept the materialistic view, what reason do we have to believe that a mind in a simulated body has any less subjective experience than a mind in a "real" body?
  - hutzlibu 5y ago
    "what reason do we have to believe that a mind in a simulated body has any less subjective experience than a mind in a "real" body? " That reality is seemingly indefinitely complex and any simulation we have, very simplifying. I am pretty sure, for emotions and co, it takes a bit more sophisticated simulation - if it can be achieved digitally, at all.

userbinator 5y ago

What are the ethics of writing code that would result in its "suffering"? Do you have the same concerns about other, perhaps much simpler but also virtual and pseudointelligent entities, such as computer-controlled players in games? It does raise some deeply philosophical questions about life and what it means in general.

mshroyer 5y ago
> computer-controlled players in games? Nah, I'm not particularly worried about that. Because those are all currently based on models too simple to conceivably have anything like consciousness. On the other hand, once we can simulate a human and its environment at OpenWorm's targeted level of abstraction, presumably we would have a conscious being there?
- reuben364 5y ago
  The only consciousness we experience is our own. In the extreme, we can no more say a chair suffers than a human being other than ourselves. Of course we take the pragmatic approach of deciding things that look like suffering to us is suffering.
  - mshroyer 5y ago
    I strongly disagree. The human brain, in its connectome, encompasses enough computational complexity to contain consciousness and suffering. A chair does not, at least not based on any model I've yet seen proposed.
    - reuben364 5y ago
      And on what basis do you claim that computational complexity is a necessary condition for consciousness and suffering? There is only one datum you have for consciousness. Other people can tell you that they experience consciousness, but so can a Text-to-Speech program
      - handol 5y ago
        Would you believe that a text-to-speech program was suffering if it told you so?
        reuben364 5y ago
        > Of course we take the pragmatic approach of deciding things that look like suffering to us is suffering. Hence why I said this. There is nothing you can use to believe a human's claims over the text-to-speech's claims, so we choose what looks like suffering to us. However, my point is that it is an arbitrary choice.
        pjerem 5y ago
        > There is nothing you can use to believe a human's claims over the text-to-speech's claims Of course there is. The human facing me looks similar to me so I can interpolate its claims with my own experience of being an human. I thinks it’s also for the same reason that we have variable degrees of empathy against animals : the more the animal looks like us (that can be size, number of members, physically, in terms of effective communication…), the more, on average, we have empathy for them. This can go to the extent that people commonly feel « something » about their cars and their human-face-like designs combined with their single ability to move.
        reuben364 5y ago
        Yes, but this is arbitrary. That is my point. There's no reason to believe that you can extrapolate your own subjective experience to others based on their similarity to you.

scollet 5y ago

Thanks for spurring this thread. This has been pretty great.

hutzlibu 5y ago

"What are the ethics of writing code that would result in its "suffering"? " I doubt that code can suffer. We do not understand feelings enough and this might help to understand it eventually - but for now I see no reason to assume that they can recreated digitally. And I am much more worried, about many real life beings that suffer in our food chain and co.

mshroyer 5y ago
Why would we assume subjective experience can't be recreated digitally? Inert "code" can't suffer, of course. But assuming we accept the materialistic view, what reason do we have to believe that a mind in a simulated body has any less subjective experience than a mind in a "real" body?
- hutzlibu 5y ago
  "what reason do we have to believe that a mind in a simulated body has any less subjective experience than a mind in a "real" body? " That reality is seemingly indefinitely complex and any simulation we have, very simplifying. I am pretty sure, for emotions and co, it takes a bit more sophisticated simulation - if it can be achieved digitally, at all.