Apple doesn't do E2E, and there's no evidence they are going to. It's very likely they just legally can't. First, the FBI (which supposedly stopped the last at

Apple doesn't do E2E, and there's no evidence they are going to. It's very likely they just legally can't. First, the FBI (which supposedly stopped the last attempt to introduce E2E) has more concerns than CSAM. Second, the current scanning system + E2E will have significant weaknesses* compared to server side scanning. As it is, Apple will pay the same legal costs as it would be if it had implemented E2E without scanning. The only way to answer both concerns is to have way more invasive scanning than Apple told us it would do. IMHO, iCloud E2E is just a made up slogan to justify Apple snooping on the device. The real future is just way more scanning. * The scanning database must receive updates after the images have been uploaded, because the hash as described inherently cannot catch most offenders right away. It's an issue of both space (the proposal is based on a perceptual hash, but the hash must be far smaller than the original, so similar images can't all get the same hash) and timing (NCMEC can't find new CSAM right away). However, the images were likely deleted on the device, so neither side has access to allow rescanning in the E2E scenario. Unless.. The solutions here all involve more scanning than the original proposal.