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>Lets not have client side scanning apologists here. It's not scanning on the client side, it's hashing. People on this site should really understand the diffe

>Lets not have client side scanning apologists here. It's not scanning on the client side, it's hashing. People on this site should really understand the difference. The alternative, as many have pointed out, is them uploading your whole image to be scanned server side. Smart money is that this is a move in front of Apple encrypting your whole icloud backup, and they have to do something if they don't want the legal, political, and social liability of being a free encrypted cloud storage for CSAM. There's lots of reasons to criticise Apple, this isn't one.

saiya-jin 5y ago
Well that's a convenient set of arguments, lets politely agree to disagree. Privacy is #1 selling point for Apple phones for geeks, it for sure ain't some mediocre hardware catching what chinese manufacturers released 1-2 generations before, nor sheepish bragging mentality that is so popular in poorer parts of the world. They broke privacy. It ain't some super bendy term that you can argue about and twist to suit your current needs, in similar vein as ie truth. Lets break it down - private means mine and mine only, 0 other access, here, there, everywhere. Anything else is not private, whatever 'noble' cause you wrap it in that keeps shifting with time, location, political regime etc.. They claimed they had it. Many honestly believed them. They openly kicked it out and failed at it so badly they didn't even grok it could be an issue. Then whole clusterfuck happened as we all saw from first row. Apple doesn't have privacy, period. It can claim to have some other features, and with some they are correct. And that's about it.
jrockway 5y ago
What is scanning if not reading every byte of your private images and using an algorithm to decide whether or not to call the cops on you? It's scanning.
yyyk 5y ago
Apple doesn't do E2E, and there's no evidence they are going to. It's very likely they just legally can't. First, the FBI (which supposedly stopped the last attempt to introduce E2E) has more concerns than CSAM. Second, the current scanning system + E2E will have significant weaknesses* compared to server side scanning. As it is, Apple will pay the same legal costs as it would be if it had implemented E2E without scanning. The only way to answer both concerns is to have way more invasive scanning than Apple told us it would do. IMHO, iCloud E2E is just a made up slogan to justify Apple snooping on the device. The real future is just way more scanning. * The scanning database must receive updates after the images have been uploaded, because the hash as described inherently cannot catch most offenders right away. It's an issue of both space (the proposal is based on a perceptual hash, but the hash must be far smaller than the original, so similar images can't all get the same hash) and timing (NCMEC can't find new CSAM right away). However, the images were likely deleted on the device, so neither side has access to allow rescanning in the E2E scenario. Unless.. The solutions here all involve more scanning than the original proposal.
vineyardmike 5y ago
> It's not scanning on the client side, it's hashing. They are (their code is) looking at every item and reviewing it opaquely to us, and deciding if they should have an employee look at tiny thumbnails to tell the cops the owner is a pedophile. Its (a) not real hashing - its "perceptual" which is fancy math that says they're looking at thumbnails and (b) cycling through every item in a list and running an Algo against it is what I'd call scanning - lets not get bogged down on the terms. We all know the tech details they shared, people on this site all understand the difference. We know the algorithm is easy enough to produce collisions. We know that apple said multiple 3 letter agencies can determine what goes in the bloom filter, and it would be downloaded from the internet and not audited. We know they are going to open it up to other countries governments too. We know that its on if you want to use opt-out services. > The alternative, as many have pointed out, is them uploading your whole image to be scanned server side. > Smart money is that this is a move in front of Apple encrypting your whole icloud backup The whole image is being uploaded server side anyways. My smart money says that this won't lead to encrypted backups anytime soon. Too many other things in those backups. > social liability of being a free encrypted cloud storage for CSAM I don't really think there is much tbh. That said, it is clear people would rather have non-absolutely-private cloud than a non-absolutely-private personal device. I know I would! People criticize apple for "not letting you own the device" and this is a much bigger step down that road. I would rather a less-absolutely-private cloud service than an absolutely-private-everything where my local stuff is scanned. > There's lots of reasons to criticise Apple, this isn't one. There's lots of reasons to criticize Apple. Including this one.

saiya-jin 5y ago

Well that's a convenient set of arguments, lets politely agree to disagree. Privacy is #1 selling point for Apple phones for geeks, it for sure ain't some mediocre hardware catching what chinese manufacturers released 1-2 generations before, nor sheepish bragging mentality that is so popular in poorer parts of the world. They broke privacy. It ain't some super bendy term that you can argue about and twist to suit your current needs, in similar vein as ie truth. Lets break it down - private means mine and mine only, 0 other access, here, there, everywhere. Anything else is not private, whatever 'noble' cause you wrap it in that keeps shifting with time, location, political regime etc.. They claimed they had it. Many honestly believed them. They openly kicked it out and failed at it so badly they didn't even grok it could be an issue. Then whole clusterfuck happened as we all saw from first row. Apple doesn't have privacy, period. It can claim to have some other features, and with some they are correct. And that's about it.

jrockway 5y ago

What is scanning if not reading every byte of your private images and using an algorithm to decide whether or not to call the cops on you? It's scanning.

yyyk 5y ago

Apple doesn't do E2E, and there's no evidence they are going to. It's very likely they just legally can't. First, the FBI (which supposedly stopped the last attempt to introduce E2E) has more concerns than CSAM. Second, the current scanning system + E2E will have significant weaknesses* compared to server side scanning. As it is, Apple will pay the same legal costs as it would be if it had implemented E2E without scanning. The only way to answer both concerns is to have way more invasive scanning than Apple told us it would do. IMHO, iCloud E2E is just a made up slogan to justify Apple snooping on the device. The real future is just way more scanning. * The scanning database must receive updates after the images have been uploaded, because the hash as described inherently cannot catch most offenders right away. It's an issue of both space (the proposal is based on a perceptual hash, but the hash must be far smaller than the original, so similar images can't all get the same hash) and timing (NCMEC can't find new CSAM right away). However, the images were likely deleted on the device, so neither side has access to allow rescanning in the E2E scenario. Unless.. The solutions here all involve more scanning than the original proposal.

vineyardmike 5y ago

> It's not scanning on the client side, it's hashing. They are (their code is) looking at every item and reviewing it opaquely to us, and deciding if they should have an employee look at tiny thumbnails to tell the cops the owner is a pedophile. Its (a) not real hashing - its "perceptual" which is fancy math that says they're looking at thumbnails and (b) cycling through every item in a list and running an Algo against it is what I'd call scanning - lets not get bogged down on the terms. We all know the tech details they shared, people on this site all understand the difference. We know the algorithm is easy enough to produce collisions. We know that apple said multiple 3 letter agencies can determine what goes in the bloom filter, and it would be downloaded from the internet and not audited. We know they are going to open it up to other countries governments too. We know that its on if you want to use opt-out services. > The alternative, as many have pointed out, is them uploading your whole image to be scanned server side. > Smart money is that this is a move in front of Apple encrypting your whole icloud backup The whole image is being uploaded server side anyways. My smart money says that this won't lead to encrypted backups anytime soon. Too many other things in those backups. > social liability of being a free encrypted cloud storage for CSAM I don't really think there is much tbh. That said, it is clear people would rather have non-absolutely-private cloud than a non-absolutely-private personal device. I know I would! People criticize apple for "not letting you own the device" and this is a much bigger step down that road. I would rather a less-absolutely-private cloud service than an absolutely-private-everything where my local stuff is scanned. > There's lots of reasons to criticise Apple, this isn't one. There's lots of reasons to criticize Apple. Including this one.