3 ms·
It can be done in following way. Orb can have a baked-in private key (on hardware level). Public keys are stored in the blockchain. Each hash is signed by the p
by exo762 5y ago
It can be done in following way. Orb can have a baked-in private key (on hardware level). Public keys are stored in the blockchain. Each hash is signed by the private key stored in the orb.
- mhluongo 5y agoThat implies a centralized signing authority though. We could do all of that without the retina scanning using normal old KYC
- Tenoke 5y agoThe orbs are centralized either way. And I personally am less worried about someone having a hash of my eyeball data than my passport and everything else.
- gcr 5y agoThat's orthogonal to the point. Here's the scenario: 1. User has a "fake" biometric A, generated via GAN or [1], that's cheap and easy to produce. 2. Suppose they can present A to any orb device, generating hash(A), which signs hash(A) using its built-in private key as usual. As long as the user can generate a fake iris biometric scan accepted by an orb, no other part of the system needs to be compromised for this attack to work. 1: http://iab-rubric.org/papers/ICPR14_1649_FI.pdf http://iab-rubric.org/papers/ICPR14_1649_FI.pdf , note that liveness detection is a cat-and-mouse game
- exo762 5y agoSee my original post. It's pretty clear that process of initial distribution of tokens is not open. Volunteers are likely contributing lots of private data to the company to get their hands on orbs.