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It looks like they built a system where cloud servers can push new software to the avionics systems of flying aircraft. I predict that criminals will use that

It looks like they built a system where cloud servers can push new software to the avionics systems of flying aircraft. I predict that criminals will use that capability to perform ransomware attacks. They will demand payment and threaten to murder passengers and crew by pushing software that causes aircraft to crash. Safety-critical software should not get remote updates. Software should load from a read-only device. Crew should be able to switch software versions in seconds, ideally by physically connecting a drive with the desired software version.

KMag 5y ago
Agreed. Even if firmware updates need to be signed using threshold signatures generated by hardware security modules stored in vaults, updating firmware for any safety-critical domain (aircraft, medical devices, industrial robots, etc.) should require physical access. On a side note, did anyone else brick more than one WRT-54G WiFi AP before learning that the factory firmware didn't handle corner-case HTTP POST cases generated by FireFox? (Once, shorting two pins got TFTP working again and I could re-flash. The other time, it was really dead.) I really wish even IoT devices had a factory boot ROM with minimal "limp home" (in the case of cars, almost literally) functionality plus an ability to update flash-stored firmware. If the device uses a formally verified realtime microkernel, then it could probably get away with not being able to update the kernel over the lifetime of the device.
rbanffy 5y ago
> they built a system where cloud servers can push new software to the avionics systems of flying aircraft. I seriously doubt any aircraft would allow an in-flight software upgrade. There are so many no-no's in there that the very idea is ludicrous. There is zero chance a company that's in this business since its start would propose something as insane as this. What it may be possible is to push the software to onboard storage so it can be deployed as soon as the craft lands. Deployed if all security envelopes are correct.

KMag 5y ago

Agreed. Even if firmware updates need to be signed using threshold signatures generated by hardware security modules stored in vaults, updating firmware for any safety-critical domain (aircraft, medical devices, industrial robots, etc.) should require physical access. On a side note, did anyone else brick more than one WRT-54G WiFi AP before learning that the factory firmware didn't handle corner-case HTTP POST cases generated by FireFox? (Once, shorting two pins got TFTP working again and I could re-flash. The other time, it was really dead.) I really wish even IoT devices had a factory boot ROM with minimal "limp home" (in the case of cars, almost literally) functionality plus an ability to update flash-stored firmware. If the device uses a formally verified realtime microkernel, then it could probably get away with not being able to update the kernel over the lifetime of the device.

rbanffy 5y ago

> they built a system where cloud servers can push new software to the avionics systems of flying aircraft. I seriously doubt any aircraft would allow an in-flight software upgrade. There are so many no-no's in there that the very idea is ludicrous. There is zero chance a company that's in this business since its start would propose something as insane as this. What it may be possible is to push the software to onboard storage so it can be deployed as soon as the craft lands. Deployed if all security envelopes are correct.