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> The last election had volunteers from both sides of the aisle count votes, while a ton of normal people watched them as observers. Last year, we saw a lot of

by darawk 5y ago

> The last election had volunteers from both sides of the aisle count votes, while a ton of normal people watched them as observers. Last year, we saw a lot of Trump supporters who were convinced the election was stolen act as election observers. The process is easy for them to engage in, as well as to observe, because they're literally just counting votes. Anyone can observe and see for themselves that nothing nefarious is going on, and they don't need to be experts to do so. And how did all that work out for public trust in elections? The problem here is that, even if you personally can go validate your local election, anyone can just claim the fraud was somewhere else. A cryptographic voting system allows any citizen to validate the entire election. The value of this is very significant. Right now a right wing website can just claim say, the CA elections were riddled with fraud. The only way to even approach "disproving" that is to request data from the city/state officials...who those people do not trust in the first place. A publicly auditable voting system would short circuit all of those issues. It doesn't need to be interpretable to every single person. What it does need to have is no specific plausible fraud narrative. Right now Trump et al can simply claim ballot stuffing, or any number of other kinds of fraud. Disproving that requires access to records that most people cannot obtain, and so the narrative can retain credibility for those disposed to believing it. It's true that most people will not understand the cryptography underlying an auditable voting system, but they don't need to. In order for someone to implant a fraud narrative, they will need to come up with an explanation for how the fraud occurred. Once they do that, it will be relatively straightforward to debunk those narratives in a clear way, that, critically, does not rely on faith in trusted third parties.

acdha 5y ago
> A cryptographic voting system allows any citizen to validate the entire election. Really? Think about what we saw when the Republicans tried to claim the 2020 election was rigged and ask how a massively complex distributed system would change that. When someone argues that fake or dead people voted, the blockchain doesn’t help – you can show transactions but that doesn’t and cannot show that they were made by people who were eligible voters, and privacy makes it important that this never change. This is the same reason why blockchain systems like supply chain management fail: if you trust a third-party, you don’t need a blockchain. If you don’t, layering overhead on top won’t change that. Similarly, I really don’t see how the argument that people don’t need to understand cryptography to trust the system. You’re talking a massive, complex software system run in thousands of locations and, as we’ve seen, absence of evidence will simply be cited as proof that people covered their tracks well. Look at how many people believed conspiracies based on the hex gibberish or Windows security settings which various Trump acolytes were pushing — they had no trouble coming up with explanations which many people believe long after the subsequent debunkings. The underlying problem is that a blockchain system still depends on trusted third parties. You need to verify that someone is eligible to vote and that their vote was accurately recorded. Think about all of the claims over the years about machines recording votes for a different candidate than the user selected, moving buttons right before someone clicked, etc. – there’s no way to solve that by adding more software. Did a bunch of people get bused in to vote for someone else? A blockchain cannot solve that – you need a trusted third party, and calling them an oracle doesn’t mean that’s not what they are. What does work is the current system: the fact that bipartisan witnesses watched people being checked against voter rolls, paper being counted, and recounted, etc. meant that most people accepted the results. It’s not perfect but it works well and the fact that it’s distributed means that flaws or cheating don’t scale the way a digital system would. The danger we face now is from ideologues perjuring themselves, and a blockchain won’t change that because the problem is that they don’t want to accept the results and are actively trying to subvert the system. A blockchain won’t help with the new rules being put into place to allow political interference or suppress voters, but it will distract from the things which might.
- darawk 5y ago
  > Really? Think about what we saw when the Republicans tried to claim the 2020 election was rigged and ask how a massively complex distributed system would change that. A massively complex system that can be validated from a single point. That is the key component. > When someone argues that fake or dead people voted, the blockchain doesn’t help – you can show transactions but that doesn’t and cannot show that they were made by people who were eligible voters, and privacy makes it important that this never change. This is the same reason why blockchain systems like supply chain management fail: if you trust a third-party, you don’t need a blockchain. If you don’t, layering overhead on top won’t change that. Sure, the fact that it does not solve every problem does not mean it isn't a viable improvement. It solves a large class of trust problems in elections, and is orthogonal to the remaining ones. > The underlying problem is that a blockchain system still depends on trusted third parties. You need to verify that someone is eligible to vote and that their vote was accurately recorded. Think about all of the claims over the years about machines recording votes for a different candidate than the user selected, moving buttons right before someone clicked, etc. – there’s no way to solve that by adding more software. Did a bunch of people get bused in to vote for someone else? A blockchain cannot solve that – you need a trusted third party, and calling them an oracle doesn’t mean that’s not what they are. This is not necessarily the case. Cryptographic tokens can be issued to eligible voters. Yes, you still need to trust that the issuing authority is legitimate. But that is much easier to validate. Anyone who feels they are eligible but didn't receive one can say so. Anyone who did receive one can validate that their vote was counted. > What does work is the current system: the fact that bipartisan witnesses watched people being checked against voter rolls, paper being counted, and recounted, etc. meant that most people accepted the results. It’s not perfect but it works well and the fact that it’s distributed means that flaws or cheating don’t scale the way a digital system would. Right, but that relies on people in Texas trusting people in California - an inherently unstable system. Allowing the entire thing to be validated from the center is a massive improvement.
  - acdha 5y ago
    > A massively complex system that can be validated from a single point. That is the key component. … > Sure, the fact that it does not solve every problem does not mean it isn't a viable improvement. It solves a large class of trust problems in elections, and is orthogonal to the remaining ones. Can you explain which problems you believe this solves, in detail? It's categorically untrue to say that it can be validated from a single point and I think that's the key gap in these solutions: voting involves people and that happens outside of what a software system can see. You can deploy a VC's dream of ineffective technologies and you'd have made no progress on the core question of whether the votes you tallied were cast by legitimate voters and recorded as they intended. > This is not necessarily the case. Cryptographic tokens can be issued to eligible voters. Yes, you still need to trust that the issuing authority is legitimate. But that is much easier to validate. Anyone who feels they are eligible but didn't receive one can say so. Anyone who did receive one can validate that their vote was counted. This adds new problems: if this uniquely identifies the person and their vote, your boss, union, pastor, etc. can demand that you show them you voted the way they wanted to. If it doesn't, you have the problem that it's very hard to disprove claims that a vote wasn't recorded correctly by the system or that someone ineligible was allowed to vote. Doing it cryptographically means that your system is now far more brittle and people have to trust a complex software stack which statistically nobody can audit as opposed to simple, robust paper ballots which can be understood by grade school children. > Right, but that relies on people in Texas trusting people in California - an inherently unstable system. Allowing the entire thing to be validated from the center is a massive improvement. How does a blockchain change this? Texans are still going to claim that people in California shouldn't have been allowed to vote for the other party — they'll change the lies they're telling from saying that people are sneaking in bags of ballots to, say, claiming that the voting machines changed votes after recording them, people who weren't supposed to be eligible were allowed to vote, etc. A blockchain won't solve any of the complaints we saw about, for example, dead people voting — that takes local authorities on the ground, all over.

by darawk 5y ago

acdha 5y ago

> A cryptographic voting system allows any citizen to validate the entire election. Really? Think about what we saw when the Republicans tried to claim the 2020 election was rigged and ask how a massively complex distributed system would change that. When someone argues that fake or dead people voted, the blockchain doesn’t help – you can show transactions but that doesn’t and cannot show that they were made by people who were eligible voters, and privacy makes it important that this never change. This is the same reason why blockchain systems like supply chain management fail: if you trust a third-party, you don’t need a blockchain. If you don’t, layering overhead on top won’t change that. Similarly, I really don’t see how the argument that people don’t need to understand cryptography to trust the system. You’re talking a massive, complex software system run in thousands of locations and, as we’ve seen, absence of evidence will simply be cited as proof that people covered their tracks well. Look at how many people believed conspiracies based on the hex gibberish or Windows security settings which various Trump acolytes were pushing — they had no trouble coming up with explanations which many people believe long after the subsequent debunkings. The underlying problem is that a blockchain system still depends on trusted third parties. You need to verify that someone is eligible to vote and that their vote was accurately recorded. Think about all of the claims over the years about machines recording votes for a different candidate than the user selected, moving buttons right before someone clicked, etc. – there’s no way to solve that by adding more software. Did a bunch of people get bused in to vote for someone else? A blockchain cannot solve that – you need a trusted third party, and calling them an oracle doesn’t mean that’s not what they are. What does work is the current system: the fact that bipartisan witnesses watched people being checked against voter rolls, paper being counted, and recounted, etc. meant that most people accepted the results. It’s not perfect but it works well and the fact that it’s distributed means that flaws or cheating don’t scale the way a digital system would. The danger we face now is from ideologues perjuring themselves, and a blockchain won’t change that because the problem is that they don’t want to accept the results and are actively trying to subvert the system. A blockchain won’t help with the new rules being put into place to allow political interference or suppress voters, but it will distract from the things which might.

darawk 5y ago
> Really? Think about what we saw when the Republicans tried to claim the 2020 election was rigged and ask how a massively complex distributed system would change that. A massively complex system that can be validated from a single point. That is the key component. > When someone argues that fake or dead people voted, the blockchain doesn’t help – you can show transactions but that doesn’t and cannot show that they were made by people who were eligible voters, and privacy makes it important that this never change. This is the same reason why blockchain systems like supply chain management fail: if you trust a third-party, you don’t need a blockchain. If you don’t, layering overhead on top won’t change that. Sure, the fact that it does not solve every problem does not mean it isn't a viable improvement. It solves a large class of trust problems in elections, and is orthogonal to the remaining ones. > The underlying problem is that a blockchain system still depends on trusted third parties. You need to verify that someone is eligible to vote and that their vote was accurately recorded. Think about all of the claims over the years about machines recording votes for a different candidate than the user selected, moving buttons right before someone clicked, etc. – there’s no way to solve that by adding more software. Did a bunch of people get bused in to vote for someone else? A blockchain cannot solve that – you need a trusted third party, and calling them an oracle doesn’t mean that’s not what they are. This is not necessarily the case. Cryptographic tokens can be issued to eligible voters. Yes, you still need to trust that the issuing authority is legitimate. But that is much easier to validate. Anyone who feels they are eligible but didn't receive one can say so. Anyone who did receive one can validate that their vote was counted. > What does work is the current system: the fact that bipartisan witnesses watched people being checked against voter rolls, paper being counted, and recounted, etc. meant that most people accepted the results. It’s not perfect but it works well and the fact that it’s distributed means that flaws or cheating don’t scale the way a digital system would. Right, but that relies on people in Texas trusting people in California - an inherently unstable system. Allowing the entire thing to be validated from the center is a massive improvement.
- acdha 5y ago
  > A massively complex system that can be validated from a single point. That is the key component. … > Sure, the fact that it does not solve every problem does not mean it isn't a viable improvement. It solves a large class of trust problems in elections, and is orthogonal to the remaining ones. Can you explain which problems you believe this solves, in detail? It's categorically untrue to say that it can be validated from a single point and I think that's the key gap in these solutions: voting involves people and that happens outside of what a software system can see. You can deploy a VC's dream of ineffective technologies and you'd have made no progress on the core question of whether the votes you tallied were cast by legitimate voters and recorded as they intended. > This is not necessarily the case. Cryptographic tokens can be issued to eligible voters. Yes, you still need to trust that the issuing authority is legitimate. But that is much easier to validate. Anyone who feels they are eligible but didn't receive one can say so. Anyone who did receive one can validate that their vote was counted. This adds new problems: if this uniquely identifies the person and their vote, your boss, union, pastor, etc. can demand that you show them you voted the way they wanted to. If it doesn't, you have the problem that it's very hard to disprove claims that a vote wasn't recorded correctly by the system or that someone ineligible was allowed to vote. Doing it cryptographically means that your system is now far more brittle and people have to trust a complex software stack which statistically nobody can audit as opposed to simple, robust paper ballots which can be understood by grade school children. > Right, but that relies on people in Texas trusting people in California - an inherently unstable system. Allowing the entire thing to be validated from the center is a massive improvement. How does a blockchain change this? Texans are still going to claim that people in California shouldn't have been allowed to vote for the other party — they'll change the lies they're telling from saying that people are sneaking in bags of ballots to, say, claiming that the voting machines changed votes after recording them, people who weren't supposed to be eligible were allowed to vote, etc. A blockchain won't solve any of the complaints we saw about, for example, dead people voting — that takes local authorities on the ground, all over.