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> You counting some tiny subset of the votes is not an audit. We, it actually is. Audits serve to verify the results from one or more constituencies. Unless yo
by nuerow 5y ago
> You counting some tiny subset of the votes is not an audit.
We, it actually is. Audits serve to verify the results from one or more constituencies. Unless you somehow believe that each and every constituency has bee tampered with, you focus your attention onto the "tiny subset" that you deemed questionable.
> There is not a single person on earth who could audit an entire federal election on their own. There are multitude people because you need multitude people.
I don't understand why you feel that's relevant. An election involves public participation, and the goal is to ensure the public that the process is fair and reliable. If enough people find that the results are not reliable in any way then they are able to verify it themselves. If however only half a dozen voters in a universe of a few hundred thousand voters disagree with the result, and the vast majority of the electorate doesn't agree with the half dozen sceptics, then where's the value in it?
I mean, this whole hypothetical scenario relies on the assumption that a party/candidate that has a sizeable support is somehow not able or interested in verifying election results, but a single isolated individual is?
- fastball 5y ago> If enough people find that the results are not reliable in any way then they are able to verify it themselves The whole point is that they can't. They need to rely on other people to verify the results. They cannot "verify it themselves". > hypothetical scenario relies on The hypothetical scenario relies on wanting the benefits of digital voting (of which there are many) without the major downside (of which there is one). A publicly verifiable ledger gives you the benefits of digital without the major downside, which is that generally with anything digital you can commit fraud at scale.